Rhodesian
Bush War
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
The Rhodesian Bush War – also
known as the Second Chimurenga
or the Zimbabwe War of Liberation – was a civil war
which took place between July 1964 and December 1979[n 1]
in the unrecognised
country of Rhodesia (latterly
Zimbabwe Rhodesia).[n 2][18]
The conflict pitted three forces
against one another: the Rhodesian government, under Ian Smith
(later the Zimbabwe Rhodesian government of Abel Muzorewa);
the Zimbabwe
African National Liberation Army,
the military wing of Robert Mugabe's Zimbabwe
African National Union; and the Zimbabwe
People's Revolutionary Army of Joshua Nkomo's
Zimbabwe
African People's Union.
The war and its subsequent Internal Settlement, signed in 1978 by Smith and Muzorewa, led to the
implementation in June 1979 of universal suffrage and end of white minority rule
in Rhodesia, which was renamed Zimbabwe Rhodesia
under a black majority government. However, this new order failed to win
international recognition and the war continued.
Negotiations between the government
of Zimbabwe Rhodesia, the British government and Mugabe and Nkomo's united
"Patriotic Front"
took place at Lancaster House, London in December 1979, and the Lancaster
House Agreement was signed. The country returned
temporarily to British control and new elections were held under British and Commonwealth supervision in March 1980. ZANU won the election and Mugabe
became the first Prime
Minister of Zimbabwe on 18 April 1980, when the country
achieved internationally-recognised Background
The origins of the war in Rhodesia
can be traced to the colonization of the region by white
settlers in the late 19th century, and the
dissent of black African nationalist leaders who opposed white minority rule.[19]
Rhodesia was settled by British and South African pioneers beginning in the
1890s and while it was never accorded full dominion status, Rhodesia
effectively governed itself after 1923. In his famous "Wind of Change" speech addressed to the parliament of South Africa in
1960, British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan
stated Britain's intention to grant independence to British territories in
Africa.[20]
As a consequence many Rhodesians,
white and black, were concerned at the possibility that decolonisation
and native rule would bring chaos, as had resulted when the Congo became independent.[20]
Britain's unwillingness to compromise on the policy of "No
independence before majority rule"
led to Rhodesia unilaterally declaring independence on 11 November 1965. Though Rhodesia had the unofficial
support of neighbouring South Africa and Portugal, which governed Mozambique,
it never gained formal recognition from any country.[21][22]
Most white Rhodesians viewed the war
as one of survival with atrocities committed in the former Belgian Congo,
the Mau Mau Uprising campaign in Kenya and elsewhere in Africa fresh in their
minds. Many whites (and a sizable minority of black Rhodesians) viewed their
lifestyle as being under attack, which both had considered safer and with a
higher standard of living than many other African countries. Although the vote
in Rhodesia was open to all, regardless of race, property ownership
requirements effectively denied the franchise to most of Rhodesia's blacks.[23]
The 1969 constitution provided for "Non-Europeans" (principally
blacks) to elect representatives for eight of the seats in the 66 seat parliament. A further eight seats were reserved for tribal chiefs.
Amidst this backdrop, black nationalists
advocated armed struggle to bring about independence in Rhodesia. Resistance
also stemmed from the wide disparities in wealth possession between blacks and
whites. In Rhodesia, Europeans owned most of the fertile land whilst Africans
were crowded on barren land,[24]
following forced evictions or clearances by the colonial authorities.[25]
Two rival nationalist organizations
soon emerged: the Zimbabwe
African People’s Union (ZAPU)
and the Zimbabwe
African National Union (ZANU),
following a split in the former in August 1963, following disagreements over
tactics as well as tribalism and personality clashes.[26]
ZANU and its military wing ZANLA were headed initially by the Reverend
Ndabaningi Sithole, and later Robert Mugabe, consisted mainly of the Shona-speaking
tribes. ZAPU and its military wing ZIPRA consisted mainly of Ndebele ethnic groups under Joshua Nkomo.[19]
Cold War politics played into the conflict also, with the Soviet Union
supporting ZIPRA and China providing support to ZANLA. Each group subsequently fought
a separate war against the Rhodesian security forces, and the two groups
sometimes fought against each other as well.[27]
In June 1979, the governments of Cuba and Mozambique offered direct military assistance to the Patriotic Front,
but Mugabe and Nkomo declined.[28]
Other foreign nations also contributed to the conflict, for instance North Korean
military officials taught Zimbabwean militants how to use explosives and arms
in a camp near Pyongyang.[29]
By April 1979 12,000 ZANLA guerrillas were training in Tanzania, Ethiopia, and Libya while 9,500 of its 13,500 extant cadres were operating in
Rhodesia.[7]
On the other side of the conflict South Africa clandestinely provided both
material and military support to the Rhodesian government.[21]
Inevitably the Bush War occurred
within the context of regional Cold War in Africa, and became embroiled with a
number of conflicts in several neighbouring countries as well. Such conflicts
included the Angolan
War of Independence (1961–1975) and Angolan Civil War
(1975–2002), the Mozambican
War of Independence (1964–1974) and Mozambican Civil War (1977–1992), and the Shaba I (1977)
and Shaba II (1978)
conflicts.[30]
Perceptions
The conflict was seen by the
nationalist groups and the British government of the time as a war of national
and racial liberation. The Rhodesian government saw the conflict as a fight
between one part of the country's population (the whites) on behalf of the
whole population (including the black majority) against several externally
financed parties made up of predominantly black radicals and communists.
The Nationalists saw their country as having been occupied and dominated by a
foreign power, namely Britain, since
1890.[31]
The British government, in the
person of the Governor, had indirectly ruled the country from 1923, when it took
over from the British
South Africa Company and granted self-governing status to a locally-elected government, made up predominantly of
whites. Ian Smith's Rhodesian Front
party was elected to power in 1962 and unilaterally
declared independence on 11 November 1965 to preserve
what it saw as the self-government it had possessed since 1923.[31]
The minority Rhodesian government
believed they were defending Western values, Christianity,
the rule of law and democracy by fighting Communists; however, they were unwilling to
compromise on most political, economic and social inequalities. The Smith
administration held that the traditional chiefs were the legitimate voice of
the black Shona and Ndebele population, not the ZANU and ZAPU nationalists, who
it regarded as dangerous, violent usurpers.[32]
In 1978–1979 the Smith
administration attempted to blunt the power of the nationalist cause by
acceding to an "Internal Settlement" which ended minority rule,
changed the name of the country to Zimbabwe-Rhodesia,
and arranged multiracial elections, which were held in
1979 and won by Bishop Abel Muzorewa,
who became the country's first black head of government. However, unsatisfied
with this and spurred on by Britain's refusal to recognise the new order, the
nationalist forces persisted.
Ultimately the war ended when, at
the behest of both South Africa (its major backer) and the United States, the
Zimbabwe Rhodesian government ceded power to Britain with the Lancaster
House Agreement in December 1979. The British
government then held another election in
1980 to form a new government. Britain
recognised this new government, headed by Robert Mugabe, and the newly
independent and internationally recognised country was renamed Zimbabwe.
Belligerents
Rhodesian
Security Forces
Two soldiers of the Rhodesian
African Rifles aboard a patrol boat on Lake Kariba,
December 1976. Black Rhodesians made up most of the government's Security
Forces, but some units were all-white.[33]
Despite the impact of economic and
diplomatic sanctions, Rhodesia was able to develop and maintain a potent and
professional military capability.[34]
In June 1977, Time magazine reported that "man for man, the Rhodesian
army ranks among the world's finest fighting units."[35]
The army was always a relatively
small force, consisting of just 3,400 regular troops in 1970.[36]
However, by 1978–79 it had grown to some 10,800 regulars nominally supported by
about 40,000 reservists – though by the last year of the war, perhaps as few as
15,000 were available for active service. While the regular army consisted of a
professional core drawn from the white population (and some units, such as the Rhodesian SAS
and the Rhodesian
Light Infantry, were all-white), by 1978–79 the
majority of its complement was actually composed of black soldiers.[33]
The army reserves, in contrast, were
largely white and, toward the end of the war, were increasingly being called up
to deal with the growing insurgency. The regular army was supported by the
para-military British
South Africa Police with a strength of about 8,000 to
11,000 men (the majority of whom were black) and supported by between 19,000 to
35,000 police reservists (which, like their army counterparts, were largely
white). The police reserves acted as type of home guard.[33]
The war saw the extensive operation
of Rhodesian regulars as well as elite units such as the Selous Scouts
and the Rhodesian
SAS. The Rhodesian Army
fought bitterly against the black nationalist guerrillas. The Rhodesian Army
also comprised mostly black regiments such as the Rhodesian
African Rifles. As the war went on, the frequent
callup of reservists was increasingly utilized to supplement the professional
soldiers and the many volunteers from overseas.[37][38]
By 1978 all white males up to the
age of 60 were subject to periodic call-up into the army; younger men up to 35
might expect to spend alternating blocks of six weeks in the army and at home.
Many of the overseas volunteers came from Britain, Ireland, South
Africa, Portugal, Hong Kong, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and the United
States of America with the latter three being held in high regard for their
recent Vietnam War experience.[37][38]
The Rhodesian Army was, considering
the arms embargo, well-equipped. The standard infantry weapon was the Belgian FN FAL Rifle as
produced in South Africa under license as the R1 Rifle and supplemented by the H&K G3
rifle that came from Portuguese forces. However other weapons such as the
British L1A1 variant of the FAL and the older British Lee-Enfield
bolt action
rifle were used by reservists and the British
South Africa Police. Other weapons included the Bren LMG, Sten SMG, Uzi, Browning Hi-Power
pistol, Colt M16 rifle (very late in the war), FN MAG
general-purpose machine-gun, 81 mm mortar,
and Claymore mines. After UDI Rhodesia was heavily reliant on South African and
domestically-produced weapons and equipment, as well as international smuggling
operations, commonly referred to as "sanction-busting".[22]
The Rhodesian Air Force (RhAF) operated a variety of equipment and carried out
numerous roles, with air power providing the Rhodesians with a significant
advantage over their enemy.[34]
When the arms embargo was introduced, the RhAF was suddenly lacking spare parts
from external suppliers and was forced to find alternative means of keeping
their aircraft flying. The RhAF was also relatively well equipped and used a
large proportion of equipment which was obsolete, such as the World War II
vintage Douglas Dakota transport aircraft and the early British jet-fighter the de Havilland Vampire. It also used more modern types of aircraft like the Hawker Hunter
and Canberra bombers, the Cessna Skymaster
as well as Aérospatiale
Alouette III helicopters until they were
supplemented by the Augusta Bell 205.[34]
Very late in the war, the Rhodesian forces were able to obtain and use a very
few smuggled in Augusta Bell UH-1 Iroquois
helicopters.[39]
At the beginning of the war much of
Rhodesia's military hardware was of British and Commonwealth origin but during the course of the conflict new equipment
such as armoured cars were procured from the South Africans. Several
Polish-made T-55 tanks
destined for Idi Amin's regime in Uganda were diverted to Rhodesia by the South
Africans, though only in the last year of the war.[40]
The Rhodesians also produced a wide range of wheeled mine-proofed armoured
vehicles, often using Mercedes Unimog, Land Rover and Bedford truck
components, including unlicensed copies of the Mercedes-Benz
UR-416.[41]
The means with which the Rhodesians
procured weaponry meant that the arms embargoes had little effect on the
Rhodesian war effort. During the course of the war most white citizens carried
personal weapons, and it was not unusual to see white housewives carrying submachine guns.
A siege mentality set in and all civilian transport had to be escorted in
convoys for safety against ambushes. Farms and villages in rural areas were
frequently attacked.
The Rhodesian government divided the
nation into eight geographical operational areas: North West Border (Operation
Ranger), Eastern Border (Operation Thrasher), North East Border (Operation
Hurricane), South East Border (Operation Repulse), Midlands (Operation
Grapple), Kariba (Operation Splinter), Matabeleland (Operation Tangent), Salisbury and District ("SALOPS").
Nationalist
guerrilla forces
The two major armed groups
campaigning against Ian Smith's government were the Zimbabwe
African National Liberation Army
(ZANLA), the armed wing of the Zimbabwe
African National Union (ZANU),
and the Zimbabwe
People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA),
the armed wing of the Zimbabwe
African People's Union (ZAPU).
The fighting was largely rural, with the two rival movements attempting to
secure peasant support and to recruit fighters while harassing the
administration and the white civilians. To ensure local domination, ZANLA and
ZIPRA sometimes fought against each other as well as against the security
forces.[27]
Unlike the town-dwellers, rural whites faced danger and many were killed but in
1979 there were still 6,000 white farmers. They were vulnerable every time they
left the homestead.
ZANLA
ZANLA was the armed wing of ZANU.[31]
The organization also had strong links with Mozambique's
independence movement, FRELIMO. ZANLA, in the end, was present on a more or less permanent
basis in over half the country, as evidenced by the location of the
demobilisation bases at the end of the war, which were in every province except
Matabeleland North.[42]
In addition, they were fighting a civil war against ZIPRA, despite the
formation of a joint front by their political parties after 1978.[27]
It was ZANLA's intention to occupy the ground, supplant the administration in
rural areas, and then mount the final conventional campaign. ZANLA concentrated
on the politicisation of the rural areas using force, persuasion, ties of
kinship and collaboration with spirit mediums.[43]
ZANLA tried to paralyze the
Rhodesian effort and economy by planting Soviet anti-tank land mines
on the roads. From 1972 to 1980 there were 2,504 vehicle detonations of land
mines (mainly Soviet TM46s), killing 632 people and injuring 4,410. The mining
of roads increased as the war intensified; indeed the increase from 1978 (894
mines or 2.44 mines were detonated or recovered a day) to 1979 (2,089 mines or
5.72 mines a day) was 233.7%.[44]
In response, the Rhodesians
co-operated with the South Africans to develop a range of mine protected
vehicles. They began by replacing air in tyres with water which absorbed some
of the blast and reduced the heat of the explosion. Initially, they protected
the bodies with steel deflector plates, sandbags and mine conveyor belting.
Later, purpose built vehicles with V shaped blast hulls dispersed the blast and
deaths in such vehicles became unusual events.[n 3][45]
ZIPRA
ZIPRA was the anti-government force
based around the Ndebele ethnicity, led by Joshua Nkomo,
and the ZAPU political organization. In contrast to ZANLA's Mozambique
links, Nkomo's ZIPRA was more oriented towards Zambia for local bases. However, this was not always with full
Zambian government support: by 1979, the combined forces based in Zambia of
ZIPRA, Umkhonto we Sizwe (the armed wing of the African
National Congress of South Africa) and South-West
African SWAPO fighters
were a major threat to Zambia's internal security. Because ZAPU's political strategy relied more heavily on negotiations
than armed force, ZIPRA did not grow as quickly or elaborately as ZANLA, but by
1979 it had an estimated 20,000 combatants, almost all based in camps around
Lusaka, Zambia.
ZIPRA was responsible for two
attacks on civilian Air Rhodesia Viscount aeroplanes, on 3 September 1978 and 12 February 1979. Using SAM-7 surface-to-air missiles, the guerrillas shot down each plane during its ascent as
it took off from Kariba Airport.[46][47]
ZIPRA took advice from its Soviet instructors in formulating its version of
popular revolution and its strategy for taking over the country. There were
about 1,400 Soviets, 700 East German and 500 Cuban instructors deployed to the
area.[2]
On the advice of the Soviets, ZIPRA
built up its conventional forces, and motorised with Soviet armored vehicles
and a number of small airplanes,[48]
in Zambia. ZIPRA's (i.e. ZAPU's) intention was to allow ZANLA to bring the
Rhodesian forces to the point of defeat, and then to take the victory from the
much lighter forces of ZANLA and the essentially defeated Rhodesians. ZIPRA
kept a light presence within Rhodesia, reconnoitering, keeping contact with the
peasants and sometimes skirmishing with ZANLA.[49]
ZIPRA's conventional threat actually
distracted the Rhodesians from fighting ZANLA to an extent. By the late 1970s,
ZIPRA had developed a strategy known as Storming the Heavens to launch a
conventional invasion from Zambia, supported by a limited number of armoured
vehicles and light aircraft. An operation by the Rhodesian armed forces to
destroy a ZIPRA base near Livingstone in Zambia was never launched.[49]
The ZAPU/ZIPRA strategy for taking
over Zimbabwe proved unsuccessful. In any event, the transfer of power to black
nationalists took place not by the military take-over expected by ZAPU/ZIPRA,
but by a peaceful and internationally supervised election. Rhodesia reverted
briefly to real British rule, and a general election took place in early 1980.
This election was supervised both by the UK and international forces.
Robert Mugabe (of ZANLA/ZANU) won
this election, being the only major competitor for the vote of the majority
ethnicity, the Shona. Once in power, Mugabe was internationally recognised as
Zimbabwe's leader and was installed as head of government, as well as having
the backing of the overwhelming majority ethnic group. He was therefore able to
quickly and irreversibly consolidate his power in Zimbabwe, forcing ZAPU, and
therefore ZIPRA which was ZAPU's army, to give up hope of taking over the
country in the place of ZANU/ZANLA.
Pre-war
events
Civil
disobedience (1957–1964)
In September 1956, bus fares in Salisbury were raised to the point at which workers were spending
between 18% and 30% of their earnings on transportation.[51]
The City Youth League responded by boycotting the United Transport Company's
buses and succeeded in preventing the price change. On 12 September 1957
members of the Youth League and the defunct ANC formed the Southern
Rhodesia African National Congress,
led by Joshua Nkomo. The Whitehead administration
banned the SRANC in 1959 and arrested 307 leaders, excluding Nkomo who was out
of the country, on 29 February in Operation Sunrise.[18][51][52]
Nkomo, Mugabe, Herbert Chitepo,
and Ndabaningi Sithole established the National Democratic Party in January 1960.
Nkomo became its leader in October. An NDP delegation headed by Nkomo attended
the constitutional conference in January 1961. While Nkomo initially supported
the constitution, he reversed his position after other NDP leaders disagreed.
The government banned the NDP in December 1961 and arrested NDP leaders,
excluding Nkomo who, again, was out of the country. Nkomo formed the Zimbabwe
African People's Union which the
Whitehead administration banned in September 1962.[18][51][52]
The United Federal Party (UFP) had been in power since 1934, earning it the nickname
of "the establishment", and roughly represented Southern Rhodesian
commercial and major agricultural interests.[53]
The UFP contested the 1962
general election on a ticket of racial
"partnership", whereby blacks and whites would work together.[50][54]
All ethnically discriminatory legislation would be immediately repealed,
including the Land Apportionment Act, which defined certain areas of the land
as eligible for purchase only by blacks, others as exclusively for whites, and
others as open for all races.[50]
About 45% of the country was split
in this way; another 45% comprised reserved Tribal Trust Lands, which housed
tribesmen, and gave local chiefs and headmen a degree of self-government in a
similar manner to American Indian reservations. The remainder was national land. The country had
originally been split up in this way during the early days of white immigration
to prevent the new arrivals from using their superior finances to buy all of
the land in the country.[50]
The UFP proposed to do away with the
black and white purchase areas, but to keep the Tribal Trust and national
lands.[50]
It also committed itself to general black advancement. These proposals proved
largely repugnant to the mostly white electorate, which feared that premature
black ascendancy would threaten Rhodesia's economic prosperity and security, as
well as their own personal affairs.[50][54]
Most turned away from the ruling
party, causing a surprise result in the 1962 election: the UFP was routed by
the more conservative Rhodesian Front
(RF), a new party opposed to any immediate shift to black rule.[50]
The RF duly formed a new government, with Winston Field
and Ian Smith
as Prime Minister and Deputy Prime Minister respectively.[54]
Nkomo, legally barred from forming a new political party, moved ZAPU's
headquarters soon after, to Dar es Salaam,
Tanzania.[52]
In July 1963, Nkomo suspended Ndabaningi Sithole, Robert Mugabe, Leopold Takawira,
and Washington Malianga for their opposition to his continued leadership of ZAPU.[55]
On 8 August they announced the establishment of the Zimbabwe
African National Union. ZANU
members formed a militant wing, the Zimbabwe
African National Liberation Army,
and sent ZANLA members to the People's Republic of China for training.[52]
Course
of the war
First
phase (1964–1972)
On 4 July 1964 ZANU insurgents
ambushed and murdered a white foreman from Silverstreams Wattle Company, Pieter
Johan Andries (Andrew) Oberholzer. The killing had a lasting effect on the
small, close-knit white community, even though it was an isolated incident.[8][9][56]
The Smith administration subsequently moved to detain the ZANU and ZAPU
political leadership in August 1964. The major political leaders imprisoned
were Ndabaningi Sithole, Leopold Takawira,
Edgar Tekere,
Enos Nkala
and Maurice Nyagumbo. The remaining military leaders of ZANLA were Dare
ReChimurenga, Josiah Tongogara and the barrister Herbert Chitepo.
Operating from bases in Zambia and later from Mozambique,
militants subsequently began launching attacks against Rhodesia.[57]
The conflict intensified after the Unilateral Declaration of Independence from Britain on 11
November 1965.[56]
Sanctions were implemented by the British government after UDI, and
member states of the United Nations
endorsed the British embargo. The embargo meant the Rhodesians were hampered by a lack
of modern equipment but used other means to receive vital war supplies such as
receiving oil, munitions, and arms via the government of apartheid-era
South Africa. War material was also obtained through elaborate international
smuggling schemes, domestic production, and equipment captured from
infiltrating enemy combatants.[22]
Five months later on 28 April 1966,
the Rhodesian Security Forces engaged militants in Sinoia, during
the first major engagement of the war.[18]
Seven ZANLA men were killed during the fighting and in retaliation the
survivors killed two civilians at their farm near Hartley three weeks later.[56]
Prior to the collapse of Portuguese
rule in Mozambique in 1974–75, the Rhodesians were able to defend their
frontier with Zambia with relative ease and prevent many guerrilla incursions.
The Rhodesians were able to set up a strong defensive line along the Zambezi River
running from Lake Kariba to the Mozambique border. Here 30-man camps were
established at 8 kilometer intervals supported by mobile rapid reaction units.
Between 1966 and 1970 these defences accounted for 175 insurgents killed for
the loss of 14 defenders.[36]
The conflict continued at a low level until 21 December 1972 when ZANLA
attacked Altena Farm in north-east Rhodesia. In response the Rhodesians moved
to hit their enemy in their foreign camps and staging areas before they could
infiltrate into Rhodesia.[58]
Secret cross-border operations by
the Special
Air Service began in the mid-1960s, with
Rhodesian Security Forces already engaging in hot-pursuits into Mozambique.
However three weeks after the attack on Altena Farm, ZANLA killed two civilians
and abducted another who was subsequently taken into Mozambique and then
Tanzania. In response SAS troops were inserted into Mozambique with the
approval of the Portuguese administration, in the first officially sanctioned
external operation. The Rhodesian government began authorizing an increasing
number of external operations.[58]
In the first phase of the conflict
(up until the end of 1972), Rhodesia's political and military position appeared
to be a strong one. Nationalist guerrillas had been unable to make serious
military inroads against Rhodesia. In the early 1970s the two main nationalist
groups faced serious internal divisions, aid from the Organization
of African Unity was temporarily suspended in 1971
and 129 nationalists were expelled from Zambia after they were alleged to have
plotted against President Kenneth Kaunda.[59]
Britain's efforts to isolate
Rhodesia economically had not forced major compromises from the Smith
Government. Indeed, late in 1971 the British and Rhodesian Governments had
negotiated a compromise political settlement which would have bowed to the Smith
Government's agenda of postponing majority rule into the indefinite future.
Nevertheless, when it was found that such a delayed approach to majority rule
was unacceptable to most of Rhodesia's African population, the deal fell apart.[60]
It would take the collapse of Portuguese rule in Mozambique to create new
military and political pressures on the Rhodesian Government to accept the
principle of immediate majority rule.
Second
phase (1972–1979)
The black nationalists continued to
operate from secluded bases in neighbouring Zambia and from FRELIMO-controlled
areas in the Portuguese colony of Mozambique,
making periodic raids into Rhodesia. By 1973
guerrilla activity was increasing in the aftermath of the Altena Farm raid,
particularly in the northeast part of the country where portions of the African
population were evacuated from border areas, and compulsory military service
for whites was extended to one year.[61]
In April 1974, a left wing coup in
Portugal heralded the coming end of colonial rule in Mozambique. FRELIMO formed
a transitional government within months, and officially took over the country
in June 1975. Such events proved beneficial to ZANLA but disastrous for the
Rhodesians, adding an additional 800 miles of hostile border.[62]
Indeed with the demise of the Portuguese empire Ian Smith realised Rhodesia was
surrounded on three sides by hostile nations and declared a formal state of
emergency. Soon Mozambique closed its border, however Rhodesian forces
continued to cross the border in "hot pursuit" raids, attacking the
nationalists and their training camps.[63]
By 1975–76 it was clear that an
indefinite postponment of majority rule, which had been the cornerstone of the
Smith Government's strategy since UDI, was no longer viable. Even overt South
African support for Rhodesia was waning as, in March 1975, the South Africans
withdrew a border police unit that had been assisting to protect Rhodesia's
border with Zambia.[64]
Late in 1976, Ian Smith accepted the
basic elements of the compromise proposals made by US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger
to introduce majority rule within two years.[65]
The Smith Government then sought to negotiate an acceptable settlement with
moderate black leaders, while retaining strong white influence in key areas.
The Rhodesian military, in turn, had the job of eroding the rising military
strength of the ZANLA and ZIPRA to the greatest extent possible in order
"buy time" for an acceptable political settlement to be reached.
Nyadzonya
raid
The Rhodesian Security Forces called
up part-time soldiers in preparation for a major counter-offensive on 2 May
1976.[66]
On 9 August 1976, Rhodesian Selous Scouts
attacked a ZANLA camp at Nyadzonya in Mozambique containing over 5,000
guerrillas and several hundred refugees. The Selous Scouts, who numbered 72,
dressed in FRELIMO uniforms and disguised their vehicles, attaching FRELIMO
licence plates and painting them in FRELIMO colours. White soldiers wore black
ski masks. They crossed the unmanned border crossing into Mozambique at 0005
hours on 9 August and drove through the early morning to the camp, passing
several FRELIMO sentries who saluted them as they went by.[67]
When they reached the ZANLA camp at
0825 hours the six ZANLA soldiers on duty allowed them to enter, and the
Rhodesian vehicles moved in and took up prearranged positions around the edge
of the parade ground, on which stood about 4,000 guerrillas. When all was ready
a Rhodesian soldier took his vehicle loudspeaker and announced, in Shona,
"Zimbabwe tatona" – translated into English, "We have
taken Zimbabwe". The cadres began cheering and ran towards the vehicles,
packing around them as more ran onto the parade ground from other areas of the
camp.[67]
The Rhodesians then opened fire and
continued shooting until there was no movement on the parade ground, at which
time they returned to Rhodesia. More than 1,000 ZANLA insurgents were reported
killed by the Rhodesians, with four Selous Scouts lightly wounded. This figure
is corroborated by ZANLA's official report on the matter,[n 4]
though publicly both ZANLA and ZIPRA claimed that Nyadzonya had been a refugee
camp.[67]
Later, on October 7, 1976, militants
bombed a railroad bridge over Matetsi River when a train carrying ore passed
over.[68]
As the conflict intensified, the
United States and Britain attempted to negotiate a peaceful settlement. However this
was rejected by the Rhodesian government insofar as it involved any potential
surrender of power to the ZANLA or ZIPRA.
Escalation
of the war (1977)
By 1977 the war had spread
throughout Rhodesia. The ZANLA continued to operate from Mozambique and
remained dominant among the Mashona peoples in eastern and central Rhodesia.
Meanwhile ZIPRA remained active in the north and west, using bases in Zambia
and Botswana, and were mainly supported by the Ndebele tribes.[62]
With this escalation came increasing sophistication and organisation. No longer
were the guerrillas the disorganised force they had been in the 1960s. Indeed
now they were well-equipped with modern weapons, and although many were still
untrained, an increasing number had received training in Communist bloc and
other sympathetic countries.[70]
Weapons fielded included AK47 and SKS assault rifles, RPD and RPK light machine guns, as well as RPG-2 and RPG-7 rocket propelled grenade launchers. The Rhodesians only
discovered how well equipped the nationalists had become when raids on
guerrilla base areas towards the end of the war revealed mortars, 12.7mm and
14.5mm heavy machine guns and even heavier calibre weapons such as 122mm
multiple rocket launchers.[70]
On 3 April 1977, General Peter Walls
announced the government would launch a campaign to win the "hearts and
minds" of Rhodesia's black citizens.[71]
In May Walls received reports of ZANLA forces massing in the city of Mapai in Gaza Province,
Mozambique.
Prime Minister Smith gave Walls permission to destroy the base. Walls told the
media the Rhodesian forces were changing tactics from contain and hold to search and destroy, "adopting hot pursuit when necessary."
On 30 May 1977, 500 troops passed
the border and travelled 60 miles to Mapai, engaging the ZANLA forces with air cover from the Rhodesian Air Force and
paratroopers in C-47 Dakotas. The Rhodesian government said the military killed 32 ZANLA
fighters and lost one Rhodesian pilot. The Mozambican government disputed the
number of casualties, saying it shot down three Rhodesian planes and a
helicopter and took several troops prisoner, all of which Minister of Combined
Operations Roger Hawkins denied.[72][73][74]
The United
Nations Security Council
subsequently denounced the incursion of the "illegal racist minority
regime in Southern Rhodesia" into Mozambique in Resolution
411, on 30 June 1977.[75]
Walls announced a day later that the Rhodesian military would occupy Mapai until they had eliminated ZANLA's presence. Kurt Waldheim,
the Secretary-General
of the United Nations, condemned the incident on 1 June,
and Rhodesian forces withdrew. The American, British, and Soviet governments
also condemned the raid.[72]
Militants bombed Woolworth's
department store in Salisbury on 6 August 1977, killing 11 and injuring 70.[76]
They killed sixteen black civilians in eastern Rhodesia on 21 August, burning
their homes on a white-owned farm.[77]
In November 1977, in response to the buildup of ZANLA guerrillas in Mozambique,
Rhodesian forces launched Operation Dingo,
a pre-emptive combined arms surprise attack on guerrilla camps at Chimoio and
Tembue in Mozambique. The attack was carried out over three days, from November
23 to 25, 1977. While these operations reportedly inflicted thousands of
casualties on Robert Mugabe's ZANLA cadres, probably blunting guerrilla incursions
in the months that followed, a steady intensification of the insurgency
nevertheless continued through 1978.
In order to disrupt FRELIMO's hold
on Mozambique, the Rhodesian Central
Intelligence Organization helped to
create and support its own insurgency movement within Mozambique. This
guerrilla group, known as RENAMO battled with FRELIMO even as Rhodesian forces fought the
ZANLA within Mozambique.
In 1978 450 ZANLA militants crossed
the Mozambique border and attacked the town of Umtali. At the time ZANU said the militants were women, an unusual
characteristic, but in 1996 Joyce Mujuru
said the vast majority involved were men and ZANU concocted the story to make
Western organizations believe women were involved in the fighting.[80]
In retaliation for these acts the Rhodesian Air Force bombed guerrilla camps
125 miles inside Mozambique, using 'fatigued' Canberra
B2 aircraft and Hawker Hunters
— actively, but clandestinely, supported by several of the more capable
Canberra B(I)12 aircraft of the South African Air Force. A number of joint-force bomber raids on guerrilla
encampments and assembly areas in Mozambique and Zambia were mounted in 1978,
and extensive air reconnaissance and surveillance of guerrilla encampments and
logistical build-up was carried out by the South African Air Force on behalf of the RhAF.
Airliners
shot down
Rhodesian external operation
extended into Zambia after Nkomo's ZIPRA nationalists shot down two unarmed Vickers Viscount
civilian airliners with Soviet supplied SA-7
heat-seeking missiles. Encamped beneath the path of ascent towards Salisbury
from Kariba Airport, the ZIPRA cadres downed Air Rhodesia Flight 825 on 3 September 1978 and Air Rhodesia Flight 827 on 12 February 1979. In the first incident, eighteen
civilians on board survived, and five of these went away to find water. Half an
hour later nine ZIPRA fighters arrived, promising help; three of the thirteen
survivors hid when they saw them. In the words of Time magazine, the
ZIPRA cadres "herded together the ten people at the wreckage, robbed them
of their valuables, and finally cut them down with automatic weapons fire".
Nkomo claimed responsibility for the attack and spoke of it to the BBC in a way Rhodesians considered gloating.[46]
In the second attack all 59 people on board were killed in the crash.[47]
In retaliation for the shooting down
of Flight 825 in September 1978, Rhodesian Air Force Canberra bombers, Hunter
fighter-bombers and helicopter gunships attacked the ZIPRA guerrilla base at
Westlands farm near Lusaka in October 1978, warning Zambian forces by radio not
to interfere.[81]
The increased effectiveness of the
bombing and follow-up 'air mobile' strikes using Dakota-dropped
parachutists and helicopter 'air cav' techniques had a significant effect on
the development of the conflict. As late as September 1979, despite the
increased sophistication of guerrilla forces in Mozambique, a raid by Selous
Scouts, with artillery and air support, on "New Chimoio" still
reportedly resulted in heavy ZANLA casualties.[n 5]
However, a successful raid on the Rhodesian strategic fuel reserves in Salisbury also underscored the importance of concluding a negotiated
settlement and achieving international recognition before the war expanded
further.
Military
pressure
The larger problem was that by 1979,
combined ZIRPA and ZANLA strength inside Rhodesia totalled at least 12,500
guerrillas and it was evident that insurgents were entering the country at a
faster rate than the Rhodesian forces could kill or capture them. In addition,
22,000 ZIPRA and 16,000 ZANLA fighters remained uncommitted outside the
country.[82]
Joshua Nkomo's ZIPRA forces were preparing their forces in Zambia with the
intent of confronting the Rhodesians through a conventional invasion. Whether
such an invasion could have been successful in the short term against the well
trained Rhodesian army and air force is questionable. However, what was clear
was that the insurgency was growing in strength daily and the ability of the
security forces to continue to control the entire country was coming under
serious challenge.[67]
By putting the civilian population
at risk, ZIPRA and the ZANLA had been particularly effective in creating
conditions that accelerated white emigration. This not only seriously
undermined the morale of the white population, it was also gradually reducing
the availability of trained reserves for the army and the police. For a
discussion see:
The economy was also suffering badly
as a result of the war with the Rhodesian GDP in consistent decline in the late
1970s.[82]
Politically, the Rhodesians were
therefore pinning all their hopes on the "internal" political
settlement that had been negotiated with moderate black nationalist leaders in
1978 and its ability to achieve external recognition and support. This internal
settlement led to the creation of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia
under a new constitution in 1979.
Resolution
Under the agreement of March 1978,
the country was to be known as Zimbabwe-Rhodesia,
and in the general election of 24 April 1979, Bishop Abel Muzorewa
became the country's first black prime minister. The factions led by Nkomo and
Mugabe denounced the new government as a puppet of white Rhodesians and fighting
continued. The hoped for recognition of the internal settlement, and of
Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, by the newly elected Conservative government of Margaret Thatcher
did not materialize after the latter's election in May 1979. Likewise, despite
the fact that the US Senate voted to lift sanctions against Zimbabwe-Rhodesia,
the Carter administration also refused to recognize the internal settlement.
While Prime Minister Thatcher
clearly sympathized with the internal settlement and thought of the ZANLA and
ZIPRA leaders as "terrorists", she was prepared to support a push for
further compromise if it could end the fighting.[83]
Britain was also reluctant to recognize the internal settlement for fear of
fracturing the unity of the Commonwealth.
Thus later in 1979, the Thatcher government called a peace conference in London
to which all nationalist leaders were invited.[84]
The outcome of this conference would
become known as the Lancaster
House Agreement. During the conference, the
Zimbabwe-Rhodesian Government accepted a watering down of the 1978 internal
settlement while Mugabe and Nkomo agreed to end the war in exchange for new
elections in which they could participate. The economic sanctions imposed on
the country were lifted in late 1979, and British rule resumed under a
transitional arrangement leading to full independence. On 21 December 1979 a
cease-fire was subsequently announced.[84]
The elections of 1980 resulted in a
victory for Robert Mugabe, who assumed the post of prime minister after ZANU-PF received
63% of the vote. Accusations of voter intimidation by Mugabe's guerrilla
cadres, sections of which were accused of not having assembled in the
designated guerrilla assembly points as required under the Lancaster House
Agreement, may have led the Rhodesian military to give serious consideration to
a coup d'état in March 1980.[40]
This alleged coup was to have
included the assassination of Mugabe and coordinated assaults on ZANLA
guerrilla assembly points within the country. However, even in the context of
alleged voter intimidation by ZANLA elements, widespread support for Mugabe
from large sections of the black population (in particular from his own Shona tribal
group which made up the overwhelming majority of the country's population)
could not be seriously disputed. Moreover, the clear absence of any external
support for such a coup, and the inevitable conflagration that would have
engulfed the country thereafter, scuttled the plan.[40]
The result was that on 18 April 1980
the country gained independence and international recognition. On the second
anniversary of this event the government changed the name of the country's
capital from Salisbury to Harare.
Aftermath
Following independence, Robert
Mugabe acted incrementally to consolidate his power.
Fighting between ZANLA and ZIPRA
units broke out in 1981 and led to what has become known as Gukurahundi,
a Shona term which translates roughly to mean "the early rain which washes
away the chaff before the spring rains".[85]
The Gukurahundi campaigns, which are also called the Matabeleland
Massacres, ran from 1982 to 1985. Mugabe used his North Korean-trained Fifth
Brigade to crush any resistance in
Matabeleland. German journalist Shari Eppel estimates the number of Matabele
murdered in these first years after the war to be about 20,000.[86]
Beyond Zimbabwe's borders, as a
result of Rhodesian aid and support for RENAMO, the Rhodesian Bush War also helped influence the outbreak
of the Mozambique Civil War, which lasted from 1977 until 1992. That conflict claimed
over a million lives, and also led to some 5 million people being made
homeless.
The entire wiki article with images
and maps can be found at:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rhodesian_Bush_War
There are many other links to
reading all the lessons learned about the Rhodesian Bush War.
The intent is to apply these lessons
learned to "we the people" in the new world USA. Said another way, as
a Marine I tend to avoid politics as often a waste of my time, but will use any
lessons learned if I think it benefits myself and my Family, especially in homeland
defense situations. So make up your own mind where you live, if you choose.
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