By
James R. Holmes
The transit came as commentators
speculated that the unrest convulsing Egypt might interrupt shipping through
the canal. How? The military regime might close it — or threaten to do so — in
an effort to wring more aid out of Western countries. Or, supporters of ousted
President Mohamed Morsi might launch some type of assault. Should the Muslim
Brotherhood protests metastasize into an insurgency, attacks on infrastructure
could become part of its repertoire. How better to discredit the army's
capacity to maintain order, elicit a self-defeating overreaction, or both, than
by choking off a precious source of revenue?
That any such action will take place
is doubtful … but never say never. Suppose, perchance, that the Suez were
closed or disabled for some significant interval. The economic and military
effects would reverberate throughout Asia and the Atlantic world. Such a
debacle would lock eyes on maps, for one thing.
The Mediterranean Sea is a true
middle sea, ringed almost entirely by solid landmasses. Its only natural
entryways are at Gibraltar to the west and the Dardanelles and Bosporus —
outlets into the Black Sea, another inland sea — to the east. Shutting the
Suez, then, would temporarily erase the closest sea route connecting Europe and
the North American east coast with the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf energy
resources. Shipping would be forced to detour around the Cape of Good Hope,
adding thousands of miles to voyages. Shipping firms and navies would incur
extra fuel costs, and extra wear-and-tear on crews and hulls. Weeping would
ensue. Teeth would be gnashed.
There is historical precedent for
rearranging the map of Egypt, and the sea lanes with it. St. Petersburg
dispatched its Baltic Fleet to the Far East during the Russo-Japanese War of
1904-1905. Japan's ally Great Britain refused the tsar's fleet passage through
the canal, which London controlled at the time. Circumstances thus compelled
Russian mariners to undertake the debilitating journey around Africa, through
the Indian Ocean, and into the China seas to do battle with the Imperial
Japanese Navy. Small wonder wreckage from the fleet soon lay strewn across the
floor of the Tsushima Strait, the scene of combat.
Nor have time and technology negated
the canal's importance. The Axis closed the Mediterranean to Allied shipping
for a time during World War II, burdening communications with South Asia. And
in 1956, Britain, France, and Israel attacked Egypt to wrest back control of
the canal after President Gamal Abdel Nasser's government nationalized it. It
took U.S., Soviet, and UN diplomatic intervention to dislodge the invading
forces.
Now as in bygone decades, access to
the Indian Ocean basin could prove suspect in times of crisis or armed strife.
Prolonged closure of the Suez would rearrange the U.S. Navy's map of Eurasia.
Faced with long transits around the Cape of Good Hope, naval leaders would be
tempted to transfer forces to the Pacific Fleet, which would suddenly enjoy
closer, easier access to the western Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf than would
the Atlantic Fleet. The South China Sea would assume new importance as a
Pacific Fleet conduit to South Asia. Finding new places to forward-deploy
forces, or expanding existing bases convenient to the region, would take on new
urgency.
This wouldn't quite amount to a
butterfly effect, whereby a butterfly flaps its wings on one side of the globe
and whips up a tempest on the other. Clearly, though, the contest over who
rules Egypt could ripple far beyond that beleaguered land. It's worth pondering
potential workarounds — just in case.
The link to this article can be found at:
http://thediplomat.com/the-naval-diplomat/2013/08/21/never-say-never-what-if-egypt-did-close-the-suez-canal/
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