By
Zachary Keck
Along with the Strait of Hormuz in the Persian
Gulf near Iran and Oman, the Strait of Malacca is the world’s most important
shipping chokepoint.
Linking the Indian Ocean to the
South China Sea and Pacific Ocean, the Malacca Strait is by far the shortest
maritime route connecting Persian Gulf energy producers to their largest
consumers in countries like China, Japan, and South Korea.
50,000 merchant ships carrying 40
percent of all world trade pass through the 900-km long (550 miles) strait each
year. It’s particularly strategic for regional energy supplies. According to
the U.S. government’s Energy Information Agency (EIA),
in 1993 about 7 million barrels per day (bbl/d) of oil and petroleum
products—at the time about 20 percent of global seaborne traded oil— transited
the Strait of Malacca. By 2011, this number had risen to 15 million bbl/d or 33
percent of all seaborne traded oil.
Northeast Asia’s dependence on oil
coming through the strait is remarkable. Japan relies on the Malaccan Strait for about 90 percent of its oil imports. As
recently as 2010, China relied on the strait for some 80 percent of its
imported oil. Little wonder then that former President Hu Jintao famously
referred to China’s Malacca Dilemma.
Three nations—Singapore, Malaysia,
and Indonesia— sit atop the Malaccan Strait, which is just 1.7 miles (2.7 km)
wide at its narrowest point. While foreign navies like the United States have
traditionally operated in the area, and China’s navy has increasingly taken a
strong interest in doing so, the naval forces of these littoral states should
not be overlooked.
Indeed, taking stock of their
strategic location, all three countries have acquired submarine forces, with
Indonesia in particular possessing considerable subsurface ambitions for the
future.
The Republic of Singapore’s Navy
(RSN) has one of the most formidable submarine forces in the region, commissioning its sixth vessel in May. All six of
the vessels were purchased from Sweden in two different batches.
Four of Singapore’s submarines are
of the Challenger-class variant. Purchased from Sweden
in the 1990s and delivered between 1995-1997, the Challenger-class submarines
displace 12,000 tons when submerged and can travel about 20 knots underwater.
Each unit has 6 torpedo tubes and carries about 10 of Sweden’s Type 613
torpedoes and 4 of Sweden’s Type 431 torpedoes.
With these submarines ageing,
Singapore again turned to Sweden for its underwater capabilities, agreeing to purchase two Archer-class submarines
in 2005.The Archer-class vessels are highly upgraded versions
of the Västergötland Class diesel-electric submarines Sweden has long operated.
Notably, the Archer-class vessels have air independent propulsion (AIP)
systems, allowing them to operate quietly and remain submerged for weeks. They also have 9 torpedo tubes and carry 12 Black
Shark heavy torpedoes, 6 type 431/451 light torpedoes, as well as mines.
Singapore’s traditional rival,
Malaysia, has an enormous coastline and is also located along the strategic
Strait of Malacca. These factors led the Royal Malaysian Navy (RMN) to
determine in 2002 that it would need a small submarine force to patrol its
waters.
“We have such a large body of water
to police. We need submarines because it is a force multiplier. They can appear
anywhere and because they are stealth, they are hard to detect. That makes our
deterrent value much higher,” Malaysian Defense Minister Najib Razak explained
at the time.
Towards that end, Malaysia turned to France to service its
underwater needs, agreeing to purchase two Scorpene-class submarines (the same kind India is now buying from France)
and a refitted French submarine for training purchases. The deal was worth
1.035 billion euro at the time, which is today around US$1.3 billion. Both of
the Scorpene-class vessels were commissioned in 2009. Malaysia’s version of the
submarines does not include AIP but they do have the ability to launch EXOCET SM39 anti-ship missiles with a range of 50
km while submerged.
Malaysia’s decision to acquire the
Scorpene-class submarines has heightened Indonesia’s insecurity, causing it to
reexamine its own submarine fleet.
As the world’s largest archipelagic
country, Indonesia has coastlines stretching 108,000 km and claims
an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of around 5.8 million square km. It also sits
along at least three major maritime shipping lanes, the Malacca, Sunda and
Lombok Straits.
Not surprisingly, then, Indonesia’s
Navy, Tentara Nasional Indonesia-Angkatan Laut (TNI–AL), has long seen it fit
to operate an underwater force. Since the early 1980s, TNI-AL has operated two
submarines, the KRI Cakra and KRI Nenggala, which are U-209/1300
submarines acquired from Germany. Called Cakra-class submarines in Indonesia,
both vessels were refitted extensively by a South Korean company in the last
decade, which resulted in the modernization of their “propulsions systems,
detection and navigation systems, and new fire control and combat systems,” according to Nuclear Threat Initiative.
More importantly, Indonesia has
signaled it has ambitious plans to expand its underwater fleet, with naval
officials at times suggesting the country would like to
ultimately acquire between 14 and 18 submarines. Indonesia’s Defense Strategic
Plan of 2024 called for TNI-AL to acquire at least ten submarines by that time,
although many believe financial constraints will make this goal unattainable.
These great ambitions are partly
driven by history, Koh Swee Lean Collin, an Associate Research
Fellow at the RSIS Military Studies Program, tells The Diplomat.
“During its 'golden age' in the
1960s, the TNI-AL had up to 12 Soviet-built submarines of the 'Whiskey class.’”
Colin explains, while noting that financial constraints may limit the navy to
eight vessels for now.
Nonetheless, Indonesia is pushing
ahead with this slightly pared back goal.
After entertaining bids from
Russian, Turkish and French companies, among others, in December 2011 Indonesia
ultimately decided to purchase 3 new submarines
from South Korea’s Daewoo Shipbuilding and Marine Engineering, the company that
refitted the TNI-AL’s existing submarine fleet. The submarines are reportedly
of the Type-209/1400 diesel-electric variant, and have been described by Indonesian officials as
similar to Malaysia’s Scorpene-class. The contract was worth US$1.1 billion,
the submarines expected to be delivered between 2015-2018.
Under the terms of the contract, the
third submarine will be built in Indonesia, reflecting Indonesia’s goal of
acquiring the capability to produce submarines indigenously. Indeed, just last
month Defense Minister Purnomo Yusgiantoro reaffirmed that the country is building the
necessary infrastructure to produce submarines domestically.
Indonesia also recently completed a
new military base on Palu Bay, which will serve as the country’s submarine
base. The base took two years to build and cost US$717,000, according to Jakarta Post. The newspaper
also said that Palu Bay is “10 kilometers wide and its coastline stretches for
68 kilometers while its depth reaches 400 meters.”
Collin, the researcher at RSIS,
explains it this way:
“The primary reasons for selecting
Palu have surely got to do with geography. It's located first of all astride
the Strait of Makassar and the Palu Bay is a narrow, deep inlet (reportedly
400m) which provides maximum security for the submarine force in terms of
concealment and defense against attacks. Besides its sitting astride the
strategic waterway, Palu offers direct access northwards into the Sulawesi Sea,
where Indonesia still has outstanding dispute with Malaysia over the Ambalat
offshore oil block.”
Overall, Collin describes the purpose
of Indonesia’s submarine fleet as one of deterrence in peacetime, and
sea-control or at least sea-denial in times of war.
“Submarines certainly form a major
facet of the whole game plan” of Indonesia’s Navy, he says. “Their role is
intended largely in peacetime to constitute a 'fleet-in-being' deterrent to any
potential foe. In wartime, due to the multiplicity of possible sea approaches
the adversary may undertake, it is necessary to carry out effective sea denial
using submarines, by focusing them on the strategic SLOCs of the highest
priority.”
Owing to its geography, “Palu base
certainly serves as a 'force multiplier' in this respect,” Collin adds.
No comments:
Post a Comment