I was prompted to write in response
to the reader who commented on the recent article entitled “Six Common
Misconceptions About EMP”, by G.P., which was published in December 2014.
The reader asked specifically: “Can
we expect the 100+ nuclear power plants in the country to have meltdowns when
the grid can no longer supply the power these plants need? In particular, what
about the spent fuel pools?”
Let me first say that I personally
have met the author of this article, and I can attest that he is one of the
foremost experts on EMP in the world.
My own expertise comes from over 30
years in the commercial nuclear power industry, and it is with this background
that I am responding to the reader’s comments regarding his question on the
impact of EMP on nuclear power plants.
I wrote about the effects of EMP on
nuclear power plants in an article that was published in SurvivalBlog in 2010.
The industry was in general, quite frankly, clueless about EMP at that time. A
lot has happened in the nuclear industry since the accident at Fukushima
Dai-ichi in Japan in March 2011. This was a long-overdue wake-up call for the
industry that “beyond design basis” accidents can and do happen and that normal
events, such as tornadoes, flood, hurricanes, and earthquakes, may be more
severe than what has been previously evaluated.
I can say with some certainty that,
at this time, an EMP event (whether solar or man-made) specifically has not
been evaluated, and nuclear power plants in the USA still do not have an EMP
event as a planned initiating event. However, the events at Fukushima have
prompted the industry to re-examine those events that could impact a given
nuclear plant, depending on the region of the country that the power plant
resides and the most likely limiting scenario for that specific plant, given
the geography, geology, topography, and climate.
The industry has also created a
program called FLEX, whereby there are now two warehouses of portable pumps,
generators, and other equipment that can be transported by air or other means
in short order (in 24 hours or less) to any nuclear power plant in the USA that
experiences a beyond design basis event that challenges the already formidable
onsite safety systems that are already in place. The nuclear industry has come
together and has agreed on standard couplings and interfaces to enable these
portable pumps, generators, and other equipment to be able to be used at any
power plant in the USA. Essentially, they become “plug and play” devices that
can supplement or even replace current onsite systems that may have failed or
become inoperable due to some catastrophic event that impacted the nuclear
power plant. You can read more about the FLEX program here:
http://safetyfirst.nei.org/industry-actions/flex-the-industry-strategy-to-enhance-safety/
All of this is well and good. If a
local or regional disaster happens, the nuclear industry now seems quite
capable of responding in a timely and effective manner to reduce the impact of
any localized event at a given nuclear power plant. However, they neglected to
understand one key flaw in their premise; the usefulness of FLEX and other work
that has been done anticipates that no more than a few power plants might be
impacted by something like a large regional earthquake or other event. They did
not understand (or maybe they did not want to admit), that it might be possible
for ALL of the nuclear plants to be impacted at the same time. A national or
continent-wide EMP event could cripple or disable all of the nuclear plants in
the USA at the same time. There are not enough pumps, generators, and other
equipment to assist ALL of the nuclear plants at the same time. Additionally,
there is no provision for the possibility that the entire nation might be
impacted by a loss of transportation or communication at the same time. Thus,
all of that equipment, now sitting in the two warehouses in Phoenix and
Chattanooga, may never get transported anywhere, if the trucks are not able to
negotiate the roads and the planes or helicopters cannot fly due to the loss of
the transportation infrastructure.
However, the industry has done more
than just stage some portable equipment that may or may not ever be used. They
have delved deeply in the design of the nuclear plants and have made some very
good progress in developing other mitigating techniques that could be very
helpful in the event of an EMP.
In addition to large emergency
diesel generators, all nuclear plants in the USA have large banks of batteries
as backup. Battery backups had been expected to last perhaps just a few hours,
if the emergency diesel generators failed. Even with these batteries, there
really is not sufficient power to operate large pumps, but vital
instrumentation could be kept functional. However, careful examination and new
procedures for load-shedding and operating just certain, basic, and key
equipment have shown that it is possible for the plants to get by for more than
24 hours on batteries alone.
In addition, portable, onsite pumps
and diesels can allow the spent fuel pools to be filled (and therefore cooled)
without having the large, emergency diesels available, and plans are now in
place to actually allow the spent fuel pools to boil and refill the pools as
the water boils off. This means that given access to the available, onsite
supply of diesel fuel and access to water, the spent fuel pools may be able to
be refilled as needed and prevented from running dry for six months or possibly
more. This is a huge development in combating the biggest concern about nuclear
power plants and EMP– the possibility of boil off of the water in the spent
fuel pools and the zirconium fuel rods catching fire.
The events at Fukushima were a
blessing in disguise for anyone concerned about EMP in this country, because it
made America’s nuclear plant designers and operators really think about the
important vulnerabilities and weaknesses that could be compromised in the event
of some very unlikely but very serious beyond design basis events, and it
motivated them to come up with ways to mitigate these vulnerabilities. Thus,
instead of maybe a week or so before something catastrophic happens at the
nuclear plants after an EMP event, it may be several months before the
situation deteriorates enough to be alarmed, provided that personnel stay in
place at the power plants or relief shifts are available to act to maintain the
reactors and prevent the spent fuel pools from boiling off. However, given that
all of these power plant personnel have families who also need to be protected,
I think that is still a concern.
A petition (PRM-50-96), which was
sent to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) shortly after Fukushima and
approved by the NRC but so far not yet acted on, may yet help us. The purpose
of this petition was to require that all U.S. nuclear power plants have
reliable emergency systems onsite that are capable to operate for a period of
two years without human intervention and without off-site fuel resupply. This
petition was unique in that it was actually accepted by the NRC, and the NRC
agreed with the premise that solar storms could be a concern for nuclear power
plants due to the loss of the power grid and the loss or interruption of other
vital infrastructure. A summary of some of the key industry comments and NRC
responses, as well as a summary of the petition can be examined online.
http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=NRC-2011-0069-0109
I have extracted quotes from the
Federal Register that may help to clarify the NRC’s stated position on this
petition:
“… the NRC has concluded that the
expected frequency of such storms is not remote compared to other hazards that
the NRC requires NPPs licensees to consider.”
“The NRC believes that it is
possible that a geomagnetic storm-induced outage could be long-lasting and
could last long enough that the onsite supply of fuel for the emergency
generators would be exhausted. “
“It is also possible that a
widespread, prolonged grid outage could cause some disruption to society and to
the Nation’s infrastructure such that normal commercial deliveries of diesel
fuel could be disrupted. In such a situation, it would be prudent for licensees
to have procedures in place to address long-term grid collapse scenarios.”
“Solar storms are not specifically
identified as natural hazards in GDC 2 [General Design Criteria 2], but the
information currently available to the NRC indicates that the frequency of
these storms may be consistent with other natural hazards within the intended
scope of the GDC.”
“Accordingly, it is appropriate for
the NRC to consider regulatory actions that could be needed to ensure adequate
protection of public health and safety during and after a severe geomagnetic
storm.”
“Thus, the NRC concludes that the
petitioner’s scenario is sufficiently credible to require consideration of
emergency planning and response capabilities under such circumstances.
Accordingly, the NRC intends to further evaluate the petitioner’s concerns in
the NRC rulemaking process.”
They addressed the consequences of
long-term loss of outside power only on spent fuel pools. However, in its
ruling on PRM-50-96, the NRC decided on its own initiative to also evaluate the
effect of long-term loss of outside power on safe shutdown and core cooling:
“Although outside the scope of this
PRM, it should be noted that the NRC, as a part of its core mission to protect
public health and safety, is updating its previous evaluation of the effects of
geomagnetic storms on systems and components needed to ensure safe shutdown and
core cooling at nuclear power reactors.”
So, in this case, some (non-elected)
government officials got it right, but so far no real action has been taken.
Therefore, I urge you to write to your senators and congressmen and ask them to
contact the NRC to act on Petition PRM-50-96. It could save your life and the
lives of your family by protecting the spent fuel pools at the nuclear power
plants in the event of a nationwide EMP.
From the Survival Blog
No comments:
Post a Comment