Opinion:
F-35B Vertical Landings In Doubt For U.K.
Air show plans
highlight F-35B runway issues
May 26, 2014 Bill Sweetman | Aviation
Week & Space Technology
U.S. Marine Corps aviation boss Brig. Gen.
Matthew Glavy has said there are no plans for the F-35B to perform VLs in the
U.K., because the program staff has not finished testing the matting that is
needed to protect the runway from exhaust heat. (The program office, Marines
and Lockheed Martin did not return emails
about any part of this story.) It may sound like a simple issue, but it pops
the lids off two cans of worms: the program’s relationship with the truth, and
the operational utility of VL.
In December 2009, the
Naval Facilities Engineering Command (Navfac) issued specifications for
contractors bidding on JSF construction work. The main engine exhaust, the engineers
said, was hot and energetic enough to have a 50% chance of spalling concrete on
the first VL. “Spalling” occurs when water in the concrete boils faster than it
can escape, and steam blows flakes away from the surface.
Lockheed Martin was
dismissive. The specifications were out of date and based on worst-case
assessments, the company said, and tests in January 2010 showed that “the
difference between F‑35B exhaust temperature and that of the AV-8B is very
small, and is not anticipated to require any significant Conops [concept of
operations] changes.”
Navfac ignored Lockheed
Martin and commissioned high-temperature-concrete VL pads at four sites. At the
Navy’s Patuxent River, Md., flight-test center, F-35Bs perform VLs on a pad of
AM-2 aluminum matting, protecting the concrete from heat and blast. Why didn’t
the January 2010 tests result in a change to the specifications? How were those
tests performed? The Navy has referred those questions to Lockheed Martin,
which has repeatedly failed to answer them.
This isn’t the only
instance where Lockheed Martin has tried to shoot the messenger on the basis of
weak facts. When a Rand Corp. report last year concluded that the JSF
will cost more than three single-service programs, Lockheed Martin accused Rand
of using “outdated data” but founded that criticism on numbers that were not in
the report.
After the fiscal 2011
Selected Acquisition Report showed the F-35A cost per flight hour to be 40%
higher than the F-16’s, program leaders asserted that the Pentagon’s accountants had misinterpreted their own
numbers. Two reports later, the numbers have barely budged.
The bigger issue is that
the Pentagon bought the F-35B for two reasons: it can land on an LHA/LHD-class
amphibious warfare ship, and it can operate from an improvised forward
operating location (FOL), created around a 3,000-ft. runway. The capabilities
are complementary. Without an FOL, the amphibious force is limited to six
fighters per LHA (unless essential helicopters are off-loaded). But a short
runway is of little value unless you can use it twice.
And what Navfac calls
“standard airfield concrete” is military-grade, made with aggregate and Portland
cement. Many runways are built with asphaltic concrete—aggregate in a bitumen
binder—which softens and melts under heat.
The Marines could use
AM-2 landing pads. But AM-2 is not a friend to the agility that justifies the
F-35B over other forms of expeditionary airpower. An Air Force study calls it
“slow to install, difficult to repair, [with] very poor air-transport-ability
characteristics.” A single 100 X 100-ft. VL pad weighs around 30 tons and
comprises 400 pieces, each individually installed by two people.
Rolling or creeping
vertical landings can spread the heat load over a greater area. But there is no
sign that they have been tested on concrete, asphalt or AM-2 over asphalt. What
about multiple, close-together landings? Will hot asphalt debris stay off the
fighter’s low-observable skin?
Nobody seems willing to
say when such tests will be conducted—which is odd, because we conduct flight
tests to prove an aircraft can meet requirements. How was the requirement for
the F-35B to VL on a non-standard runway framed? Indeed, was that requirement
formally defined at all?
At least $21 billion of
the JSF’s research and development bill—including the F135 engine and the crash
weight-reduction program of 2004 as well as the powered-lift system—is directly
attributable to the F-35B, which also has the highest unit cost of any military
aircraft in production. The design compromises in the F-35B have added weight,
drag and cost to the F-35A and F-35C. It would be nice to know that—air shows
aside—it will deliver some of its promised operational utility.
Posters comments: It is being proposed to have the F-35B participate in the ceremonies surrounding the newest aircraft carrier in the UK Navy.
Posters comments: It is being proposed to have the F-35B participate in the ceremonies surrounding the newest aircraft carrier in the UK Navy.
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