Preparing for Change in North Korea

Preparing for Change in North Korea

 

The only way for Pyongyang to maintain internal stability is to open up the economy.

 

 

By Chung Min Lee in the Wall Street Journal

The most sweeping purge in North Korea in four decades has unleashed speculation in Seoul and other capitals about Kim Jong Un's leadership. The very public arrest of Jang Song Thaek, Kim's uncle and the regime's second-in-command, suggests that a struggle for power is continuing.

However, while this is an interesting parlor game, it is based on hearsay and is ultimately a distraction from more important questions. Instead policy makers should focus on three core drivers of North Korean behavior that will outlive the purges.

First, if the North is on the verge of miniaturizing nuclear warheads as suspected, this will push the nuclear threat to new levels. Kim Jong Il's most important legacy is the North's capacity to produce nuclear weapons. Whatever else Kim Jong Un may do in the military arena, it will be virtually impossible for him or any other leader to roll back or give up North Korea's nascent nuclear capabilities.

Kim Jong Un's commitment to North Korea's nuclear program is therefore akin to Pyongyang's version of the Mafia's blood oath: It is sacred, inviolable and irreversible. This is why the notion of "moderates" and "hardliners" doesn't make much sense when it comes to negotiating a nuclear deal. No one, not even Kim Jong Un, can turn the clock back on North Korea's weapons.

Second, Kim Jong Un has to show tangible progress under his leadership in the next couple of years. Totalitarian regimes are masters at blaming others for their failures, but Kim is running out of scapegoats.

For instance, when North Korea rolled out its currency reform in November 2009, Pyongyang's propaganda machinery initially heralded the then still unknown Kim Jong Un as the main architect. But as the backlash widened, the regime opted to publicly execute Park Nam-ki, the Workers' Party secretary in charge of financial and economic affairs.

Jang is the new scapegoat for economic hardships. Prominent among the charges against him is selling key resources to third countries at reduced prices as well as toying with heretical economic schemes. This shifts blame for setbacks to Jang and by extension China, which is North Korea's only real political and economic patron.

So how will Kim Jong Un stem North Korea's growing black market, improve the livelihood of his people and still manage to build more nuclear weapons? The only way is to boldly open up the North Korean economy as China did in the 1980s. But Deng Xiaoping was able to introduce reforms only after a clean break from die-hard Maoists, and that was possible because he boasted unblemished revolutionary credentials. Kim Jong Un is no Deng Xiaoping, but he must try to break out of the economic trap he inherited.

Third, for much of the next 10 years when China will be led by President Xi Jinping, managing North Korea is going to remain one of China's key foreign policy bottlenecks. Non-intervention is one of the cornerstones of China's foreign policy and that's fine for now. But chances are that events in North Korea are going to require a fundamental reorientation of China's policies. Pyongyang is emerging as the major geopolitical stumbling block tying down China's ambition to become a responsible great power.

Internal Chinese party and military interests may resist cutting Pyongyang loose. But Beijing may not be able to keep up its policy of ambiguity much longer given the instability in North Korea. In order to assure strategic stability, it makes sense for Beijing to start a concerted dialogue with Seoul and Washington on the future of the Korean Peninsula.

These three drivers all suggest that North Korea is on the cusp of big changes, as the purge of Jang Song Thaek confirms. This means Seoul and its allies and key neighbors can no longer afford merely to react to Pyongyang's moves.

What South Korea really needs is a comprehensive national security policy that will shape rather than just respond to events. For starters, on top of managing unparalleled intelligence requirements vis-à-vis developments in the North, Seoul has to also manage equally critical security choices. The former administration postponed the reversion of wartime operational control to South Korea; now the Park government is currently assessing the planned transfer in December 2015. How Seoul proceeds will have significant implications for South Korea's strategy towards the North, such as its willingness to commit bigger resources toward indigenous defense capabilities.

President Park Geun-hye's signature North Korea policy referred to as "Trustpolitik" won't be affected since it accounts for a range of developments in the North. But it also stands to reason that Seoul needs to expand its diplomatic space with key neighbors such as China but also with traditional partners including Japan.

As the recent air defense identification zone dispute has shown, bilateral cooperation in one area doesn't necessarily spill over into others. Seoul needs to upgrade ties with Beijing but by the same token, neither should it ignore critical ties with Tokyo. For its part, Tokyo should also understand that increasing its leverage in the region depends crucially on fostering significantly improved relations with Seoul. In the end, the Jang purge should serve as a wake-up call and stimulate a national debate on long-term national security objectives.

Mr. Lee is the South Korean ambassador for National Security Affairs.