INS Vikramaditya and the Aircraft Carrier
Debate
A new carrier like India’s does more than just
denote blue-water capability.
By Abhijit Singh
1362
8
The Indian Navy has been energized by the commissioning of its new aircraft carrier, the INS Vikramaditya. Coming two months after another significant achievement – the nuclear reactor of the Arihant, India’s first indigenous nuclear powered submarine, going critical – the Vikramaditya is being seen as a game changer, with the potential to transform the Indian Navy’s profile in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) and beyond.
The
ship’s proportions and capabilities are indeed significant. At 45,400 tons, the
Vikamaditya is considerably larger than any ship the Indian Navy has
ever had. Its primary aviation assets, the Kamov-31 helicopters and MiG 29K
multirole fighter aircraft – the mainstay of its integral combat capability –
are among the most advanced in the world. In addition, the naval version of the
indigenous Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) may also be positioned onboard, making
the Vikramaditya the first Indian aircraft carrier to operate two
aircraft of the Short Take off but Assisted Recovery (STOBAR) variety.
Interestingly,
Vikramaditya’s commissioning seems to have re-ignited an old debate among maritime analysts: of
the relevance of aircraft carriers in a maritime contemporary context. Proponents
of aircraft carriers argue it constitutes the core of maritime strategy and
must play a central part in a blue-water navy’s operational plans.
Opponents posit that the aircraft carrier’s high vulnerability (to new
disruptive weapons and technologies), and inadequate logistical sustainability
render it an irrelevant asset. Not only is it a financially expensive
proposition, they point out, it is also incapable of projecting significant
offensive power. The fact that it is virtually defenseless against underwater
attacks, long-range strategic airpower and ballistic missiles makes it a near liability in war.
As
compelling as the criticism appears, there is a more nuanced rationale for
retaining the giant ships. Modern day maritime discourse requires such ships to
be located in a new conceptual framework. Ocean-going navies today need three
types of conventional assets. The first category comprises “hard-power” assets:
fighting platforms like destroyers, frigates, missile boats and attack
submarines meant for the real combat operations in a naval battle. These are
used in both offensive and defensive operations, and are meant to influence the
tempo and outcome of a maritime conflict. The second lot is of “soft-power”
assets like hospital ships, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR)
platforms, survey vessels, etc. These provide a valuable regional (and global)
service and are crucial for a navy’s soft-power outreach. Finally, and most
significantly, a navy needs assets for “power projection” – a critical
component of a nation’s maritime strategy. Power projection assets are an
embodiment of a nation’s strategic capability and political intent. Navies
strive to accrete power and project it far beyond the home country as a metric
of national influence and their own regional relevance. Aircraft carriers fall
into this category.
This is
not to suggest that aircraft carriers no longer have an important combat role
to play. It is just that they do not necessarily have to be involved in high
intensity combat operations against adversaries and must be seen as fungible
assets, in terms of their utility in advancing national interests. There is
certainly prestige involved in possessing an aircraft carrier. But prestige is
increasingly coming to be recognized as equaling national influence. As
aircraft carrier supporters point out, the arrival of an aircraft carrier at a
regional port of call imparts a diplomatic impact that cannot be matched by a
submarine or a destroyer. Therefore, even while acknowledging the flexible
demands of future maritime missions on maritime forces that would necessitate a
shift towards multi-purpose warships (such as amphibious assault vessels), the
likelihood that aircraft carriers would continue to be relevant in their
present form and configuration, remains high.
If this
gives some perspective to the aircraft carrier debate, it still doesn’t settle
the supposed contest between sea control and sea
denial. Inducting an aircraft carrier, it has been suggested,
signifies the triumph of the concept of sea control over the more practical and
much less expensive notion of sea denial. The analysis tries to draw a false
equivalence between two fundamental concepts intrinsic to national maritime
strategy. While the former is a prerequisite in dictating the terms of a naval
engagement, the latter (as a subset of the former) has limited application and
is meant to deny a stronger adversary the use of maritime space. Both play a
vital role in a nation’s larger maritime strategy, but none supplants the
other.
There
is one significant difference though. Since sea-denial is useful in defending a
nation’s maritime territory against an aggressive adversary, it is primarily a
war-time concept. Sea control, on the other hand, allows for both battle-space
domination in war and the expansion of naval sphere of operations in peacetime
(a critical component of grand national strategy). Its utility as a metaphorical
enabler in naval strategy is, therefore, far greater.
For the
Indian Navy, operating two full-fledged carrier battle groups (CBGs) – one each
for the Eastern and Western seaboards – is not just a long-standing ambition,
but also a key component of its operational strategy. With the INS Viraat
nearing the end of its operational life, the Indian Navy has been under
pressure to position a suitable replacement. The INS Vikramaditya brings
it one step closer to achieving a desirable end-state. As things stand, by the
end of 2018 the navy will induct the 40,000-tonne INS Vikrant being
built at the Cochin Shipyard. The Vikramaditya, in the words of India’s
Naval Chief, Admiral D K Joshi, is intended to “bridge the gap
between the INS Viraat’s decommissioning, and the entry of the INS Vikrant.”
An
aircraft carrier, however, doesn’t by-itself guarantee an expanded sphere of
naval influence. With a limited integral defensive capability and even lesser
maneuverability, a carrier needs an armada of armed escort ships and aircraft
to protect it from external threats. In this, the Vikramaditya has an inherent disadvantage as it
lacks an on-board close-in-weapon-system (CIWS) and long-range surface-to-air
missiles (LR-SAMS). Its near total dependence on layered in-depth defense
provided by its screening ships and aircraft is a challenge that the Indian
Navy will need to address in due course.
The
Indian Navy will also be mindful of the maritime ambitions of the People’s
Liberation Army Navy (PLA-N) and the role that its new aircraft carrier – the Liaoning
– is likely to play in China’s Indian Ocean expansion. China’s new aircraft
carrier might be used both for the PLA-N’s power projection, as well as an
instrument for its soft-power diplomacy – a key component of the “far-seas”
naval strategy. That apart, the PLA-N is also said to be considering using
aircraft carrier in a hard-power role for the expansion of its island barrier defenses, also
known as the inner and outer island chains. In fact, analysts agree that China
is most likely to pursue the construction of additional aircraft carriers in
the future – which only indicates the PLA-N’s belief in the worthiness of its aircraft carrier program.
Ultimately,
possessing an aircraft carrier does not just indicate blue-water capability,
but it is also representative of a navy’s essential vision. If a maritime force
can conceive of an aircraft carrier’s role as a versatile and flexible asset –
one that can switch easily between soft power diplomacy, power projection and
combat operations – it can be a game changer, for both national foreign policy
and naval strategy.
If used
intelligently, the Vikamaditya could prove to be critical in shaping the
Indian Ocean’s strategic environment.
Abhijit
Singh is a research scholar at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses
and looks at Maritime Security in the Indian Ocean. He is co-author of the
book Indian Ocean Challenges – A Quest for
Cooperative Solutions.
(This
is an edited version of an IDSA commentary on Nov 23, 2013)
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