Panel: Taiwan Facing Increasing Chinese
Pressure
By: John Grady in USNI News
Since the 1996 Taiwan Straits crisis, when China tried to intimidate the island by testing missiles in waters near Taiwan and the United States responded by sending two carrier battle groups to the region, Beijing has built up its naval forces of conventionally powered submarines, corvettes, and frigates to influence events in “the first island chain” off its coast—and looks to extend its reach by 2050 to the Mariana Islands with nuclear-powered submarines and aircraft carriers.
Since the 1996 Taiwan Straits crisis, when China tried to intimidate the island by testing missiles in waters near Taiwan and the United States responded by sending two carrier battle groups to the region, Beijing has built up its naval forces of conventionally powered submarines, corvettes, and frigates to influence events in “the first island chain” off its coast—and looks to extend its reach by 2050 to the Mariana Islands with nuclear-powered submarines and aircraft carriers.
China “doesn’t need nuclear-powered submarines
to operate around Taiwan,” said Bernard Cole, an expert on China and the
Pacific at the National War College.
Said Dean Cheng, senior research fellow at the
Heritage Foundation, a conservative Washington think tank, “The Chinese
military is highly focused on Taiwan” on the operational level, and they
realize that the island is vulnerable to blockade since it relies on imported
food for its growing population, oil for its industries, and free sea lanes to
export its technological products. “Taiwan is very dependent on the rest of the
world,” he said.
But advances in aircraft and naval forces “are
on the horizon” as China wants to make sure that in the East and South China
Seas and the Yellow Sea that nothing happens of “which it does not approve.”
For now, Cole said, China is not building underway replenishment ships or
large-deck amphibious ships that could be used in an invasion of Taiwan. But
with China’s robust shipbuilding industry, it could be a “matter of choice” not
to go ahead with building those kinds of vessels.
Cole said this means that China is “determined
not to let Taiwan become de jure independent.” The retired Navy captain
added, “The pressure on Taiwan had been unremitting since 1949-50″ when the
Communists drove the Nationalist government of Chiang Kai-shek from the
mainland to the island. In short, Taiwan “lives within the jaws” of the Chinese
push to upgrade its anti-access, area denial capabilities, Cheng added.
The forum on Taiwan’s Maritime Security comes
in the 35th anniversary year of the United States’ diplomatic recognition of
the People’s Republic of China and the Taiwan Relations Act.
Cortez Cooper, a senior policy analyst at RAND
said for now Taiwan must concentrate on continuing its outreach to China,
establishing credible diplomacy in the region such as its East China Sea Peace
initiative to resolve regional tensions over fisheries, territory, and
hydrocarbon exploration and development, and ensuring defense in-depth until
outside assistance can arrive.
While Taiwan adopted a strategic “goal of
being able to buy time” if attacked, Cheng said that China has been moving
steadily to isolate it from its neighbors. One way China is doing that is to
punish nations that recognize the People’s Republic and then try to establish
diplomatic ties with Taipei. He pointed to China’s reaction to Rep. Howard
“Buck” McKeon’s recent visit to the region. McKeon, a California Republican and
chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, stopped first in Taiwan; and
when he set out for the mainland, the Chinese abruptly canceled all but one
meeting and briefing that had been scheduled for his stop there.
Yet politically, Taiwan’s two most recent
administrations have put “the emphasis on domestic affairs,” and one of its
political parties in the upcoming 2016 presidential elections is pushing for
independence. Among the pressing security issues facing Taiwan are how it will
handle its transition to an all-volunteer military force, what actual hardware
it needs, and what doctrinal changes need to be made to meet the new challenges
to move rapidly in the battle-space and become more interoperable militarily
with the United States, Cooper said.
Taiwan “needs to focus on a nontraditional
approach” to issues with China, including demonstrating to other nations that
it is not presenting a “unified front” with Beijing in regional disputes.
Cheng said Taiwan has the choice “to spend the
money on defense or not” and “what it is going to spend that money on”—such as
missile and air defense and anti-submarine warfare.
Speaking Wednesday at the Heritage Foundation
forum, Cooper said China has signaled other nations in the region and spoken at
security conferences that it is a power on the rise and the United States may
not be a reliable partner in the future. Beijing points to the alliances the
United States has with countries such as Taiwan, Japan, and the Philippines “as
increasingly a Cold War relic.”
“I think Beijing is very confident now,”
Cooper said.
Cole said that in every crisis since 1949,
“Beijing misjudged” what the United States intentions were and what it would
do.
China may be doing the same thing in looking
at what it calls the “Malaccan dilemma”—the United States’ ability to interdict
oil shipments, particularly through those narrow straits to the mainland. Most
supertankers have too great a depth to use those waters, Cole said.
But Cheng said the Chinese perception of what
was at stake there and in other potential flashpoints was important. He cited
the 1999 bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade as an example. The United
States said the bombing was accidental; the Chinese point to NATO claims of
precision strikes in the Kosovo operations and say it was deliberate. “China
has a different perspective on what we do.”
Although all three agreed that the United
States has become better in the past year at explaining what is doing in the Pacific,
Cheng said China has not deviated from its “its persistent and consistent
message” to the United States concerning Taiwan: stop selling arms to Taipei,
stop reconnaissance missions, and repeal parts of the National Defense
Authorization Act covering American response to its defense.
“We have to make sure we are not
outmaneuvered,” Cooper said.
Since the 1996 Taiwan Straits crisis, when
China tried to intimidate the island by testing missiles in waters near Taiwan
and the United States responded by sending two carrier battle groups to the
region, Beijing has built up its naval forces of conventionally powered
submarines, corvettes, and frigates to influence events in “the first island
chain” off its coast—and looks to extend its reach by 2050 to the Mariana
Islands with nuclear-powered submarines and aircraft carriers.
China “doesn’t need nuclear-powered submarines
to operate around Taiwan,” said Bernard Cole, an expert on China and the
Pacific at the National War College.
Said Dean Cheng, senior research fellow at the
Heritage Foundation, a conservative Washington think tank, “The Chinese
military is highly focused on Taiwan” on the operational level, and they
realize that the island is vulnerable to blockade since it relies on imported
food for its growing population, oil for its industries, and free sea lanes to
export its technological products. “Taiwan is very dependent on the rest of the
world,” he said.
But advances in aircraft and naval forces “are
on the horizon” as China wants to make sure that in the East and South China
Seas and the Yellow Sea that nothing happens of “which it does not approve.”
For now, Cole said, China is not building underway replenishment ships or
large-deck amphibious ships that could be used in an invasion of Taiwan. But with
China’s robust shipbuilding industry, it could be a “matter of choice” not to
go ahead with building those kinds of vessels.
Cole said this means that China is “determined
not to let Taiwan become de jure independent.” The retired Navy captain
added, “The pressure on Taiwan had been unremitting since 1949-50″ when the
Communists drove the Nationalist government of Chiang Kai-shek from the
mainland to the island. In short, Taiwan “lives within the jaws” of the Chinese
push to upgrade its anti-access, area denial capabilities, Cheng added.
The forum on Taiwan’s Maritime Security comes
in the 35th anniversary year of the United States’ diplomatic recognition of
the People’s Republic of China and the Taiwan Relations Act.
Cortez Cooper, a senior policy analyst at RAND
said for now Taiwan must concentrate on continuing its outreach to China,
establishing credible diplomacy in the region such as its East China Sea Peace
initiative to resolve regional tensions over fisheries, territory, and
hydrocarbon exploration and development, and ensuring defense in-depth until
outside assistance can arrive.
While Taiwan adopted a strategic “goal of
being able to buy time” if attacked, Cheng said that China has been moving
steadily to isolate it from its neighbors. One way China is doing that is to
punish nations that recognize the People’s Republic and then try to establish
diplomatic ties with Taipei. He pointed to China’s reaction to Rep. Howard
“Buck” McKeon’s recent visit to the region. McKeon, a California Republican and
chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, stopped first in Taiwan; and
when he set out for the mainland, the Chinese abruptly canceled all but one
meeting and briefing that had been scheduled for his stop there.
Yet politically, Taiwan’s two most recent
administrations have put “the emphasis on domestic affairs,” and one of its
political parties in the upcoming 2016 presidential elections is pushing for
independence. Among the pressing security issues facing Taiwan are how it will
handle its transition to an all-volunteer military force, what actual hardware
it needs, and what doctrinal changes need to be made to meet the new challenges
to move rapidly in the battle-space and become more interoperable militarily
with the United States, Cooper said.
Taiwan “needs to focus on a nontraditional
approach” to issues with China, including demonstrating to other nations that
it is not presenting a “unified front” with Beijing in regional disputes.
Cheng said Taiwan has the choice “to spend the
money on defense or not” and “what it is going to spend that money on”—such as
missile and air defense and anti-submarine warfare.
Speaking Wednesday at the Heritage Foundation
forum, Cooper said China has signaled other nations in the region and spoken at
security conferences that it is a power on the rise and the United States may
not be a reliable partner in the future. Beijing points to the alliances the
United States has with countries such as Taiwan, Japan, and the Philippines “as
increasingly a Cold War relic.”
“I think Beijing is very confident now,”
Cooper said.
Cole said that in every crisis since 1949,
“Beijing misjudged” what the United States intentions were and what it would
do.
China may be doing the same thing in looking
at what it calls the “Malaccan dilemma”—the United States’ ability to interdict
oil shipments, particularly through those narrow straits to the mainland. Most
supertankers have too great a depth to use those waters, Cole said.
But Cheng said the Chinese perception of what
was at stake there and in other potential flashpoints was important. He cited
the 1999 bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade as an example. The United
States said the bombing was accidental; the Chinese point to NATO claims of
precision strikes in the Kosovo operations and say it was deliberate. “China
has a different perspective on what we do.”
Although all three agreed that the United
States has become better in the past year at explaining what is doing in the
Pacific, Cheng said China has not deviated from its “its persistent and
consistent message” to the United States concerning Taiwan: stop selling arms
to Taipei, stop reconnaissance missions, and repeal parts of the National
Defense Authorization Act covering American response to its defense.
“We have to make sure we are not
outmaneuvered,” Cooper said.
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