Arming Captain Phillips

Arming Captain Phillips

 No ship with an armed security team aboard has been successfully pirated.

 

By John-Clark Levin in the Wall Street Journal

In the new movie "Captain Phillips, " Tom Hanks portrays Richard Phillips, the captain of the cargo ship Maersk Alabama that was taken hostage by four Somali pirates in 2009. While Hollywood takes liberties with the story, in the film Captain Phillips is eventually saved, as he was in real life, when Navy SEAL sharpshooters take out his captors. Another fact: There were no guns or armed guards aboard the vessel that may have helped its captain and crew defend themselves.

The scourge of hijackings and ransoms off Somalia was a serious epidemic from 2008-11, but such attacks have since declined dramatically. Many factors contributed, including increased international efforts to detain and prosecute pirates and their financial backers. International navies also played an essential role, sending dozens of warships to the region—but they couldn't turn the tide on their own.

As then-U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Andrew Shapiro explained in November 2011: "With so much water to patrol it is difficult for international naval forces in the region to protect every commercial vessel. Working with industry, we recently established a national policy encouraging countries to allow commercial ships transiting high-risk waters to have armed security teams on board. The reason for this is simple: to date no ship with an armed security team aboard has been successfully pirated."

That lead-from-the-front policy has paid dividends. In 2011, the U.K., Greece, Norway and other major maritime nations began letting their merchant ships carry armed private-security personnel for self-defense in hazardous waters. This overcame longstanding legal and cultural barriers such as stringent local firearms laws and fears of liability.

The result? Successful hijackings off Somalia fell by half to 14 in 2012 from 28 in 2011, and overall attacks dropped to 75 from 237. Through the third quarter of 2013, there

The main reason for this drop is that Somali piracy is an industry like any other, albeit far more brutal. When risks are low and profit margins are high, piracy flourishes. Investors on land buy shares in a piracy venture, funding weapons and equipment in exchange for a stake in any ransom. Thus to suppress piracy, the return on investment must be made unfavorable.

A major step toward making piracy less attractive to investors has been merchant vessels' increased adherence to the industry's Best Management Practices, which advise ships to travel at over 18 knots, fortify access points and take evasive action when attacked. Yet many vessels, such as bulk carriers and large tankers, are too "low and slow" to fully comply with these practices and need additional protection.

Armed private security fills the breach not by winning high-octane gunfights against pirates—although there have been a few—but through deterrence. Security companies know that most pirates are profit-seeking criminals, not fanatical terrorists. Armed guards, either on merchant ships or in their own escort boats, make their presence known, firing warning shots if pirates approach. This almost always persuades hijackers to abort their mission and seek out easier prey.

The firepower necessary to achieve this deterrence has proven cheap enough that private security has been widely adopted by the shipping industry. Security analysts estimate that between 40% and 60% of merchant ships transiting the high-risk area around the Horn of Africa now carry armed guards.

Industry leaders are impressed with the results so far. Roland Hoeger, managing director of Komrowski Shipping, told the Maritime Security Review last year that ship owners have seen their "own risk and that of the seafarers—certainly statistically—reduced to a minimum by protecting our vessels with armed guards." As unguarded ships become harder to find, more pirate gangs must return to port empty-handed, and backers ashore have seen their return on investment collapse.

Another key contribution of private security is helping shippers save fuel costs. Transiting at over 18 knots burns frightful amounts of fuel—for some ships, hundreds of thousands of additional dollars per transit. Armed teams give shippers the confidence to sail through dangerous waters at more economical speeds. The practice of "slow steaming" greatly reduces fuel consumption, but would be unthinkable without reliable defense. With many firms charging around $30,000 to protect a ship transiting the danger zone, they provide a cost-effective deterrent.

As Mr. Shapiro put it in 2012, "The ultimate security measure a commercial ship can adopt is the use of privately contracted armed security teams." Nearing the close of 2013, the record remains unblemished: Not a single ship under such protection has been hijacked by Somali pirates.

Threats are on the rise elsewhere. This year, an even more violent epidemic of piracy off West Africa surpassed the magnitude of the Somali threat, and smaller piracy problems are simmering around Indonesia and the Bay of Bengal. With European nations facing budget austerity, and America's military readiness still impacted by the sequester and fears of further cuts, overstretched navies will not be able to respond adequately.

All the more reason to further shift the burden for security onto the private sector. "As private maritime security is professionalized and regulated," says Michael Frodl, a prominent risk adviser to London insurers, "it should increasingly fill in for protection navies will no longer be able to provide."

Mr. Levin is the author, with John J. Pitney Jr. , of "Private Anti-Piracy Navies : How Warships for Hire are Changing Maritime Security," published next month by Lexington Books.