If Vietnam and China Went to War:
Five Weapons Beijing Should Fear
Editor’s Note: Please see previous works from
our (TNI – The National Interest) “Weapons of War” series including: Five NATO Weapons of War Russia Should Fear,
Five Russian Weapons of War NATO Should Fear,
Five Chinese Weapons of War America Should
Fear, Five American Weapons of War China Should
Fear, Five Japanese Weapons of War China Should
Fear, Five Best Weapons of War from the Soviet
Union and Five Taiwanese Weapons of War China Should
Fear.
By Robert Farley
In 1975, the armed forces of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam defeated the
Republic of Vietnam, capturing Saigon and putting to end nearly
thirty years of civil war. The victory came three years after
the United States, unwilling to pay the price of continued engagement, left the
war. In 1979, the People’s Republic of China invaded Vietnam in an effort to
punish Hanoi for its actions in Cambodia, and for its association with the
Soviet Union. The war lasted a month, with Chinese forces leaving after
heavy losses and without achieving any strategic objectives.
In short, the Vietnam People’s Army has a history of success. Today, Sino-Vietnamese relations are again hitting a
low point. The deployment of a Chinese oil rig in waters claimed by
Vietnam has only exacerbated tensions over control of islands in the South
China Sea. Various Vietnamese politicians, including the late Vo Nguyen Giap,
have warned about the threat of Chinese encroachment.
If war broke out, what weapons could Vietnam use? It turns out that China and Vietnam shop in
the same place; most of the weapons that Vietnam would use against
China are also in the hands of the People’s Liberation Army. However, the
implications of offensive and defensive employment vary greatly. Here are
five systems that Vietnam might use to good effect against the Chinese
military.
Su-27
Airpower played a curiously small role in the 1979 war. The People’s
Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) did not, because of problems with doctrine
and technology, have the capacity to extend itself over the battlefront.
The much smaller Vietnam People’s Air Force (VPAF) remained quiet, preferring
to play the defensive role that it had perfected against the United States a
decade earlier, but didn’t need in this conflict.
That won’t be the case the next time around. Both the VPAF and the PLAAF have upgraded
with formidable Russian, and in the latter case domestic,
aircraft. Most notable among these are members of the Su-27 Flanker
family. Vietnam operates around 40 Flankers of various types, with
another 20 on order from Russia. In addition to defense air-to-air
missions, these aircraft can strike Chinese land and sea targets with
long-range, precision cruise missiles. The Flankers are heavy, fast, and
deadly, and would see action on both sides.
In conjunction with Vietnam’s integrated air defense network, the Flankers
(as well as a few older fighters, such as MiG-21s), can threaten not only to
deny Vietnamese airspace to China, but also to punch back. We don’t yet
have a sense of how Vietnamese pilot training compares with Chinese, although
the PLAAF obviously has greater resources, and has devoted attention in recent
years to realistic training. Nevertheless, the VPAF may be able to use
its sophisticated Flankers to good defensive advantage against overstretched
Chinese forces.
Kilo Class Submarine
Analysts generally agree that the PLAN has yet to work out the most
important problems with anti-submarine warfare. While the PLAN will
undoubtedly have a huge advantage in submarines in the opening days of any
conflict, its undersea fleet is optimized for attacks against surface ships,
not fighting enemy subs.
The quiet, modern Kilo class subs that Vietnam has recently begun acquiring
from Russia will present a major problem for the PLAN. Although the
Chinese also operate Kilos (as well as a variety of other subs), these would
not necessarily neutralize the Vietnamese boats before they could exact a
toll. The Vietnamese Kilos carry both torpedoes and anti-ship cruise
missiles that could pose a big threat to Chinese warships and to Chinese
offshore installations.
Vietnam currently operates two Kilos,
with four more on order. Although China may try to pressure Russia to slow
the transfer of subs and munitions to Vietnam, Moscow is unlikely to
comply. Vietnam will field a steadily stronger submarine force over the
next few years, just as big new Chinese warships come to serve as juicy
targets.
P-800 Onyx Cruise Missile
Over the past decades, China has developed a formidable array of
cruise missiles as part of its A2/AD “system of systems.”
With China now interested in projecting power, it has to manage the budding
A2/AD systems of its neighbors. Like China, Vietnam has long pursued a variety of launch
systems for cruise missiles. Today, Vietnam can launch cruise
missiles from aircraft, surface ships, submarines, and shore based platforms.
In combination, these missiles could attack Chinese ships from multiple,
unexpected vectors in order to overwhelm the PLAN’s shipboard air defense
systems.
The shore based platforms may be the most survivable in context of a major
Chinese assault. Vietnam already operates the P-800 Onyx surface-to-surface
cruise missile, intended for coastal defense. A Mach 2.5 missile with a
180 mile range and a 250kg warhead, the Onyx can give any Chinese warship a
very bad day. Located at strategic points and defended by the VPA’s air defense
network, these missiles (as well as various older shore-launched cruise
missiles) could severely limit the PLAN’s radius of action.
S-300 SAM
The PLAAF hasn’t flown against an integrated, sophisticated air defense
system since… well, ever. Using the PLAAF against Vietnam will require
the Chinese to suppress or avoid Vietnamese air defenses. Suppression of Enemy Air Defense operations
are among the most organizationally and individually demanding missions than an
air force can undertake. The United States has developed expertise in
these missions through hard experience won in Vietnam, Kosovo, and Iraq, and
through ultra-realistic exercises over the Nevada desert. We don’t yet
know if the PLAAF has developed the kind of expertise needed to defeat the
Vietnamese air defense network. If it hasn’t, Vietnamese surface-to-air
missiles could exact a terrible toll on Chinese pilots and aircraft.
The most advanced system in the VPAF’s air defense network is the S-300. It
can track and engage dozens of targets at ranges of up to seventy-five
miles. Additional point-defense systems can protect the S-300s themselves
from attack. Used in conjunction with the fighters of the VPAF, the SAM
network would make it very difficult to carry out a concerted air campaign
against Vietnam at acceptable cost.
Space
In 1979, China tried to punish Hanoi by launching a massive infantry and
armor invasion of Vietnam’s northern provinces. The Vietnam People’s Army
(VPA) determined that the central Chinese objective was to engage and destroy
the best units of the army. Consequently, the VPA avoided committing its
most effective units until the PLA could be channeled into appropriate ambush
zones. At that point, both sides suffered heavy losses, but the Chinese
eventually withdrew.
Both the PLA and the VPA are smaller now than in 1979, but more professional, more technologically
advanced, and better organized. The VPA in particular has increased
the educational attainment of its officer corps, exposed its units to
international training and experience, and provided them with significant
equipment upgrades.
This doesn’t make the VPA the equal of the PLA, but then it doesn’t have to
be. As in 1979, the VPA has the advantage of space. The tenacity of Vietnamese infantry, often fighting with guerilla tactics
in inhospitable terrain, will probably deter the PLA from a major land incursion
into Vietnam’s north. In the unlikely event that China decides to punish
Vietnam with another ground invasion, it can expect serious losses from
mechanized counterattacks, especially given the likely inability of the PLAAF
to win air supremacy over the battlefield. The PLA is big, but the VPA
has repeatedly demonstrated a capability for finding and maximizing its
territorial assets.
Conclusion
Vietnam does not want a full-scale war with China. The best case
scenario for such a conflict is a replay of 1979, which proved humiliating for
China but very costly for Vietnam. In particular, Vietnam doesn’t want to
go toe-to-toe with China in a capital and technology intensive war that might
attrite away the expensive equipment that the VPA has acquired. Nevertheless,
China must appreciate that Vietnam has bite. The Vietnamese military, in
its current configuration, is designed to deter Chinese adventurism. We
can expect that Vietnam will enhance these capabilities as the years go on, and as provocations in the South China Sea
continue.
Robert Farley is an assistant professor at the Patterson
School of Diplomacy and International Commerce. His work includes military
doctrine, national security, and maritime affairs. He blogs at Lawyers, Guns
and Money and Information Dissemination and The Diplomat.
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