United States:
Where’s the Strategy?
Looking for a coherent national vision? The
National Security Strategy is not it.
By Andy Zelleke and Justin
Talbot Zorn
3 300
In our
troubled times, the White House’s imminent publication of its National Security
Strategy might warrant some buzz—if not at the level of a new iPhone release or
a Super Bowl commercial, at least that of a major presidential policy address.
So where’s that buzz? A clue can be found in Bob Gates’ dismissive account in
his memoirs: “Personally, I don’t recall ever having read the President’s
National Security Strategy when preparing to become Secretary of Defense…. I
never felt disadvantaged by not having read these scriptures.”
President
Barack Obama may yet surprise in his second National Security Strategy
document, expected any day. But recent history suggests that, whatever the
document’s other merits, it won’t actually contain a strategy. Nor the plausible
vision for which such a strategy would aim.
In
recent years, Washington’s National Security Strategies have been a cross
between laundry list—the many activities in which the U.S. is presently
engaged—and wish list—numerous additional activities it behooves the nation to
undertake, and the goals they support. It’s no doubt useful to have, in one
place, a list of the president’s goals in important domains (such as a homeland
secure from WMD attack, a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict,
a denuclearized Korean peninsula, and a competitive and growing economy that
can support a prominent global role); and a list of many things the government
is doing and intends to do in support of those goals. But this isn’t strategy.
A
serious national strategy would start from a cold-blooded assessment of the
global landscape, and of the most likely (but unknowable) futures that may
emerge. It would also start from an equally dispassionate assessment of the
nation’s capabilities—its strengths and weaknesses—and how these may plausibly
change over time.
It
would prioritize ruthlessly among the many desirable policy goals; as strategy
scholar Richard Rumelt has put it, “Good strategy works by focusing attention
and resources on one, or a very few, pivotal objectives whose accomplishment
will lead to a cascade of favorable outcomes….” A genuine strategy would
address head-on the inevitable hard choices and tradeoffs to be made in the
pursuit of the most-high value objectives; as strategy guru Michael Porter has
emphasized, the essence of strategy is choosing what not to do.
Moreover,
a serious strategy would link these hard choices to budgetary consequences. The
strategy would also scrutinize commitments made long ago, in different
circumstances—including alliances—to ensure that they remain value-creating for
the U.S. And it would anticipate other actors’ likely responses—and systemic
reverberations—arising from the contemplated U.S. actions, starting from a deep
understanding of those actors’ perceived interests and steering clear of overly
sanguine assumptions.
And
this strategy would explicitly support an achievable—and articulable—vision of
the future.
The
Obama 2010 National Security Strategy—like many of its predecessors—fell well
short on these criteria. It contained little in the way of alternative
futures—despite the National Intelligence Council’s extensive work on this.
Perhaps most conspicuously, the 2010 NSS left a reader with the impression that
China was (and was expected to be) nothing more than a “21st century center of
influence” on par with India and Russia. While the 2010 NSS correctly
emphasized that rebuilding the American economy and its competitiveness would
be essential to global leadership, it simply listed the “to-dos” (improve education,
get fiscal house in order, and so on) on the agenda—without considering a
scenario in which a sizable gap between U.S. and competitor growth rates
persists for many years.
There
is little in the 2010 NSS that would offend or disappoint anyone, save for Al
Qaeda, the Taliban and “Axis of Evil” governments. Part of Gates’ thinly veiled
disdain for the generic NSS was, he noted, the fact that it was the outcome of
a bureaucratic process in which many cooks needed to sign off on the broth.
That reality—together with the fact that the NSS is prepared for Congress under
the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, and released to the public—makes it an
inherently political document, inclining presidents to steer clear of
controversy. It’s not surprising that a serious strategy statement is unlikely
to emerge from this process.
The
problem for the nation, though, is far bigger than a poorly titled document.
After all, there could be a classified version of the NSS that would do,
strategy-wise, what the public NSS doesn’t. While the Goldwater-Nichols Act
calls on the President to submit both a classified and unclassified version of
the document, there’s no indication that any administration has produced a
classified version in recent years. We suspect that, if a classified version
existed, it would be in the White House’s interest to acknowledge it (as it
does many other classified documents that don’t get released to the public).
Of
course, there can be a full-fledged strategy without a document memorializing
it; and in the era of WikiLeaks, there is risk in reducing anything to writing.
But can Americans be confident that there’s a strategy—something befitting the
title “National Security Strategy”—anywhere in the White House, even if it’s
unwritten and resides in a small number of senior officials’ heads?
We are
skeptical, for one principal reason. The formulation of a coherent, holistic
National Security Strategy would almost certainly require a substantial
process. And had such deliberations taken place, we believe the Administration
would have made the public aware of that fact—as it did in enabling, as one
example, The New York Times’ extensive reporting on the Obama
Administration’s deliberations leading to the troop surge in Afghanistan.
Perhaps
not since the Eisenhower Administration’s “Project Solarium” has a White House
deliberated extensively at the “grand strategic” level as part of a structured
process. We believe this is a serious mistake.
Crises
from all corners of the globe come flying at presidents, and these shouldn’t be
managed on an ad hoc and best efforts basis. Washington’s actions should be
informed by a strategic concept in which a president has conviction and
confidence—derived not from in-the-moment intuition, but from first-rate
strategic thinking.
What
would that process look like? It would create space for the president and
his senior national security team to step back from the crises du jour: to
raise questions rarely asked, challenge unexamined assumptions and “sacred
cows,” draw on the best data from varied sources, hear unconventional
perspectives, think creatively, reflect, and prioritize. In doing so, the White
House can take some cues from other governments, and from the private sector.
Singapore,
for example, has devoted impressive attention to national strategy. It employs
diverse teams of civil servants—individuals with backgrounds ranging from
computer science to fiction writing—to think rigorously about alternative
futures and analyze data for signals about national risks and opportunities.
The city-state’s Strategic Policy Office, located in the Prime Minister’s
Office, is employed to “manage the commons” of futures thinking taking place
throughout the government and create useful decision-making tools—like national
scenarios, serious games, and SWOT analyses—for senior leaders.
And, as
we proposed in an article in Foreign
Policy in 2012, a new Chief Strategy Officer role could be adapted from the
corporate sector—not a Kissingerian “grand strategist,” but rather a
process-focused individual charged with owning and managing the strategy
formulation process. This process would facilitate the president’s and senior
team’s ability to draw on all relevant analytical tools and perspectives, to
challenge assumptions, and to identify blind-spots in national strategy
development. The appointment of a CSO would address a core problem with
strategy development in the U.S. government: that nobody below the
president—who has a fair amount on his plate—or the national security
advisor—often consumed with crisis management—actually “owns” the
responsibility to orchestrate whole-of-government strategy.
Obama
recently told The New Yorker’s David Remnick that he’s not interested in a new grand
strategy, adding “I don’t really even need George Kennan right now.”
While he may not need a grand strategist, like most presidents he could use
better process for asking and answering core questions about the nation’s
direction. Americans can live with a published National Security Strategy that
disappoints. But they will be hurt if the White House lets itself make new
high-stakes decisions—or mindlessly perpetuate old ones—without the benefit of
a clear and achievable guiding vision and the best possible strategic thinking.
Andy
Zelleke is the MBA Class of 1962 Senior Lecturer of Business Administration at
Harvard Business School, and a member of the Council of Foreign Relations.
Justin Talbot Zorn is a legislative director on Capitol Hill, and researched
public sector strategic planning as a Fulbright Scholar in Singapore.
The original article can be found at: http://thediplomat.com/2014/02/united-states-wheres-the-strategy/
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