Principles of an exit strategy

We all know we were never going to be in Iraq forever. Armchair experts know one exit strategy (rejected) had our military out in late 2003. And we do have histories of exiting small wars to include the Philippines, the Mexican border with Pancho Villa, the Banana Wars in the Caribbean and Central America, and recently even in Somalia after food relief operations in 1992-1993 and Operation Provide Comfort (1991-1996) in northern Iraq after the first Gulf War. We didn’t fall off the turnip truck yesterday, though many of our present and recent decision makers in the Executive and the Congress may have.

The principles of an exit strategy are timeless, though every strategy has it own local variations. Thus one can understand these historical principles when asking modern day questions about the small war being exited, in this case Iraq and the immediate region. This post is presented to the reader as about how to think, and not what to think. It can be the basis of asking questions as our Nation considers exit strategies today.

There should be only one person in charge of the war in Iraq, and it should be a person on the ground in Iraq. Until a D.C. based strategic decision to exit Iraq is made, then we are still in a war over winning the peace in Iraq; and that person should be the senior military commander, General Petraeus. The Ambassador Ryan Crocker must report to him, as well as all the other inter-agency groups in Iraq. This includes budget authority.

The decision to implement an exit strategy is necessarily a D.C. based one. But once the decision is made, the execution must be by a person on the ground in Iraq, and that person is the Ambassador. Upon the decision to exit, all others to include General Petraeus report to the Ambassador. This is especially important because of the difficulty of coordinating an exit between the military, the politics, the financing and reconstruction efforts, and the security provided by the police, also called the constabulary, gendarmes, guardia, and para-military. Getting the Iraqi military out of the whole police business is part of this exit strategy. How many Americans want the U.S. Army or Marines providing police services in their hometown, or expect them to have much training in this area. The same principle applies in Iraq.

The development of an exit strategy must come out of Iraq, not D.C. Here the Secretaries of State and Defense, and the President, must be ruthless about running interference for those on the ground in Iraq. This is not a case for seeking the least common denominator to keep all sides happy. Those looking for happiness should seek employment elsewhere. Now D.C. does have a strategic interest in controlling the borders of Iraq during an exit. This applies primarily to the Syrian and Iranian border areas. This is a tough nut to crack given the long borders and thousands of years of smuggling that has gone on. But the plan for the securing of the borders must come out of Iraq, and any D.C. frictions must be between the appropriate Secretary and the ground commander, either before and after an exit strategy is the plan. The ground commander in Iraq (war or exit) does not answer to anyone below Secretary level, to include anyone working for the National Security Advisor. The era of too many D.C. and CentCom bosses will come to an end. Those who do a poor job or get in the way get relieved, or voted out as appropriate.

The difficulty of executing an exit strategy is too often one of confusion over timelines. One can imagine the military gunfighters getting out first, but how about the military infrastructure units, or the police trainers, or the reconstruction teams, and even the finance teams. Too often most think of an exit strategy of being one of the gunfighters only, but in reality there are many more players working on different timelines. Again, hence the reason for there being one person in charge of an exit strategy, and it is the Ambassador, with all players reporting to him. The Secretary of State must run interference in D.C. for this Ambassador.

Last, D.C. is part of this process. One good example is a strategic reserve of gunfighters and where to base them and for how long, and who pays. One 2003 exit strategy had such a reserve leaving the cities to go into the Iraq desert. Another Murtha strategy mentions Okinawa, over 10,000 miles away. In either example, funding such a strategy is a D.C. problem; and in the case of Okinawa also a diplomatic problem. The U.S. is presently relocating many ground units away from Okinawa, mostly at Japanese request.

And D.C. should be the main effort for the regional strategies of dealing with the present frictions between Sunnis and Shiites and Persians and Arabs at the regional level. It is here that the Central Command comes into the equation as to military options.* A good example is whether or not to attack Iran’s budding nuclear capability. Any such decision would be D.C. based, but the execution would be at the Central Command level. In this case, General Petraeus will have some of his forces stripped away by Admiral Fallon long enough for this operation. It is a tough business balancing all this, but thank goodness we have really good people that are up to all this. While this discussion has little to do with an exit strategy, it is worth noting as part of the overall discussion.

*Rumsfeld changed the title from Commander to Combatant Commander to emphasize the military aspect vice the proconsul aspect of the job.