by Michael Ledeen in PJ Media
The real threats to us, and how to
deal with them, that is. Lots of well-known former foreign
policy/national security officials don’t, or feel obliged to appear “realistic”
(diplospeak for “don’t do anything, keep talking”). Some former military
officers do, although only up to a point.
Three duly respected policy
professionals, Denis Ross (Obama’s — and plenty of others’ — Middle East guru
for a few years early on), Eric Edelman (Bush’s under secretary of defense and
earlier ambassador to Turkey), and Ray Takeyh of the Council on Foreign
Relations (who recently published a very important story detailing the background of the
Iranian occupation of the US Embassy in Tehran in ’79), tell us it’s time to
get tougher with Iran:
[It's] time to acknowledge that we
need a revamped coercive strategy, one that threatens what the Islamic Republic
values the most—its influence in the Middle East and its standing at home.
In other words, threaten the regime
itself and its foreign legions in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen. But
just when you say to yourself, “Finally! They’re going to call for regime
change,” they tiptoe delicately into dipspeak: “Iranian officials must
come to understand that there will be no further concessions to reach an accord
and that time is running out for negotiations.”
Further down, they return to the
“we’re almost, kinda for regime change” theme:
the United States should consider a political warfare
campaign against Tehran to complement its economic sanctions policy. The
administration officials and its broadcast services should draw attention to
the unsavory nature of the theocratic regime and repressive behavior. Such
language will not just showcase our values but potentially inspire political
dissent.
As if the Iranian people needed the
State Department and the appeasers at the feckless Persian service of the Voice
of America to tear the blinders from their eyes and enable seem to see that
they are living in misery under a hateful regime! If you really want to
“inspire political dissent,” just do it. Call for the release of the
opposition leaders, support the students’ and workers’ and women’s movements,
and call for a national referendum on the legitimacy of the Islamic Republic.
But the three gurus aren’t calling
for that. They have no apparent interest in real political warfare,
except as part of the nuclear negotiations. They’re calling for some sort of
military action in Syria and Iraq, not as a decisive blow to the expansionist
activities of the Islamic Republic, but as an essential ingredient in the
parlay with Zarif and Rouhani. Their main objective is to compel the Tehran
regime to come to terms on the nuclear deal.
A regime stressed at home and under pressure abroad may yet
consider the price of its nuclear intransigence.
That won’t do, I’m afraid, because,
as the Washington Post said in 2012, to get an end to the Iranian
nuclear project, you have to have regime change in Tehran. To be sure,
the destruction of the Assad regime would be a major step in that direction,
but the three gurus don’t even mention that; nor, for that matter, does
the exemplary General Robert Scales, although he has a better grasp of the
dynamics of the Middle East war.
Scales, albeit using different
language, stresses the importance of defeating the jihadis on the
ground, in large part because defeat undermines their messianic
world-view. He calls it depriving the enemy of “hope,” I call it a blow
to their conviction that their bloody enterprise is blessed by Allah. It
comes to the same thing:
Think of hope as a material formed
in a crucible over time by a series of successful terrorist strikes against the
West and Western-affiliated countries in the Middle East. Since violent actions
filled this crucible, only a violent military counterresponse can crack the
crucible and empty it of hope. The object of a campaign against hope is not
necessarily to kill in large numbers but rather to find the greatest
vulnerability and shatter it dramatically and decisively.
The terrorist’s greatest source of
hope today comes from Islamic State battlefield successes in Syria and Iraq. A
defeat there cracks the crucible. The question is how to do it with enough
drama and speed that terrorists the world over lose hope and become passive.
From any perspective, the Islamic State enclave in Syria is militarily
unassailable. But Iraq is a different story.
I certainly agree with the general’s
main point — defeat of the enemy is very important, and when we defeat them it
is not just a gain of terrain but also an ideological and political victory for
our side — I think his context is too narrow, and I don’t share either his
pessimism on Syria or his surprising optimism regarding Iraq. I remain
perplexed at the failure of our policy elite to advocate all-out political and
military support for the Kurds. They are pro-Western, they are tough and
brave, and their enemies in the region are ours: above all, Iran, Turkey and
Syria. They are the most effective force against ISIS. Our failure
to do more for them is yet further evidence of Obama’s grotesque alliance with
the Iranians, from Syria and Iraq all the way down to Yemen.
In like manner, I don’t get the
optimism about Iraq, which is effectively at the mercy of Iran, and therefore a
totally unreliable force.
Why not go to the source, as my late
boss General Alexander Haig loved to intone? Tehran is the source.
Unmentioned by Scales, pigeonholed by the three gurus as a negotiating
challenge rather than the terror master of the world, its defeat should be the
West’s central mission.
Dr. Ledeen’s scholarship on Iraq, terrorism and international security has been sought after by those in and out of government and the intelligence community, the media, and policy influencers — and as a PJ Columnist, he lends this expertise to PJ Media on his blog, “Faster, Please!”
Michael sees himself as an historian, first and foremost:
I got a Ph.D. in modern European history and philosophy at Wisconsin in the sixties, when Wisconsin had the finest History Department in America. I studied with a great historian, George L. Mosse, and I was his research assistant for two books on Nazism. I spent the next fifteen or so years studying fascism, trying to understand “how could it happen?” Then I became a visiting professor at the University of Rome, and Rome correspondent for The New Republic at a time when the big stories were Communism and terrorism. Later on, I started to work on Iran. So my life has been largely spent studying evil.
Using his vast knowledge and extraordinary life experiences, Michael tries to convey the unpredictability of life in his PJ Media column:
Many pundits think that vast, impersonal forces govern the world, and so once you understand those forces — oil, or race, or class, whatever — you can foresee coming events. As an historian, I’ve learned that human behavior is wildly unpredictable. And I don’t believe in those vast forces; I think human beings are the driving force of world events. So I spend a lot of energy trying to understand the key players, but I never permit myself the luxury of believing that I know enough to accurately predict what’s going to happen next.
If you have been reading PJ Media for any period of time, you may be familiar with Michael’s writing. But you probably didn’t know that he used to be a world-class bridge player:
I was on a team that won a national championship a couple of years ago. Back in the old days, when I was really good, I played on a team organized by Omar Sharif. And one of the secrets of my “investigative” career is the number of sources I met at bridge clubs all over the place.
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