Book review: ‘Countdown to Zero Day,’ on the first
digital weapon, by Kim Zetter
By Dina Temple-Raston in the Washington Post newspaper
COUNTDOWN TO ZERO DAY
Stuxnet and the Launch of the
World’s First Digital Weapon
By Kim Zetter
Dina Temple-Raston is the
counterterrorism correspondent at NPR. She has written four books and just
returned from a Nieman fellowship at Harvard University, where she studied the
intersection of big data and intelligence, and its effects on privacy.
As you turn the last page of Kim
Zetter’s new book about the worm and virus that sabotaged Iran’s nuclear
program, don’t be surprised if you find yourself starting to mull over a career
change. Is it too late to leave radio journalism or accounting or (you fill in the
blank) to become someone who not only discovers a new breed of digital weapon
but also reverse-engineers it? In this case, the digital weapon is Stuxnet, a
malware virus let loose in an Iranian nuclear facility four years ago. And the
mere fact that I contemplated going from journalist to computer nerd should
tell you something about Zetter’s ability to turn a complicated and technical
cyber- story into an engrossing whodunit.
Zetter is a senior writer at Wired
magazine, and in her capable hands readers of “Countdown to Zero Day”
will find themselves rooting for the guys everyone loved to hate — or at least
I loved to hate. (You remember them: those high school mathletes who handed
their completed calculus tests to the teacher while the rest of us were still
struggling with the first problem set.)
“Countdown to Zero Day: Stuxnet and the Launch of the
World’s First Digital Weapon” by Kim Zetter (Crown/ )
Exhibit A: a 39-year-old biology and
genetics major out of UCLA named Eric Chien, one of Zetter’s international
cyber-detectives. As he describes it, the job came to him by accident. In the
1990s, he decided to follow a few friends to a fledgling computer security firm
called Symantec. The company was in the forefront of the effort to find those
viruses that attached themselves to programs to infect a computer.
“Cybersecurity was still a nascent
field and it was easy to get a job without training or experience,” Zetter
writes about Chien’s early career choice. “Chien knew nothing about viruses at
the time but he taught himself X86 assembly, the programming language most
malware is written in, and that was enough.” The best analysts weren’t computer
engineers anyway, Zetter maintains. Engineers built things. Virus sleuths tore
things apart.
In the late 1990s, malware or virus
analysts were like the Maytag repairman, just waiting for something to break
down. Malware, viruses and worms (a worm is a kind of virus that copies itself
and travels quickly from computer to computer) were rare.
What a difference a decade can make
— by 2009, there were not enough hours in the day for Chien and a small team at
Symantec to decipher malware programs bent on stealing information from
unprotected computers. The company now has security researchers throughout the
world working around the clock.
Initially, what made Stuxnet
different from other malware programs was that it used a “zero-day exploit,”
which is like a back door into a computer. It is a virus or a worm that can
take advantage of a vulnerability in software that others, including the
software’s creators, have not discovered yet. Zero-day exploits are rare
because software creators work hard to ensure they release programs that don’t
have those kinds of vulnerabilities. That’s why the discovery of one sends a
frisson through security analyst networks. What’s more, zero-day exploits can
fetch hundreds of thousands of dollars on the black market, depending on what
they might allow a hacker to do. So when one is discovered in malware, it
suggests a higher purpose, something beyond a cyber-criminal hoping to vacuum
up credit card numbers.
Eventually Chien and other analysts
around the world found not just one zero-day exploit in Stuxnet but a handful
of them. That only intrigued them more. They had no idea who had written it, or
why, but they were determined to find out. That’s the story at the heart of
“Countdown to Zero Day” — how analysts from Belarus to California collaborated
to piece together who created and launched the world’s first digital weapon.
To readers of David Sanger’s “Confront and Conceal,”
a lot of this material will seem familiar. In fact, Zetter footnotes and quotes
from Sanger’s Stuxnet coverage liberally. Like Sanger, Zetter was on the front
lines of the Stuxnet story as it was unfolding. But her book goes beyond simply
explaining how the worm came to life.
Before Stuxnet, most of America’s
military and intelligence cyber-operations focused on stealing or distorting
data, or used cyber-tools to help direct U.S. weapons. Stuxnet was envisioned
by U.S. officials as a replacement for a conventional weapon. Using a computer
virus or worm to gum up the works of something from within would provide an
alternative to, say, destroying a nuclear facility from the air. Stuxnet
appears to have done that. “Stuxnet stands alone as the only known cyberattack
to have caused physical destruction to a system,” Zetter writes.
Cyber-geeks will tell you that the
computer code behind Stuxnet was a thing of beauty. The worm targeted specific
Siemens industrial control systems loaded with a particular software package.
It would initially spread indiscriminately, but if it didn’t find the specific
software application it was looking for, it would turn itself off and move on
to the next machine.
Zetter says the lead architect of
Stuxnet was Gen. James “Hoss” Cartwright when he was the head of U.S. Strategic
Command. (Known as President Obama’s “favorite general,” Cartwright lost his
security clearance in 2013 amid allegations that he leaked national security
information.) According to Zetter, programmers at the National Security Agency
who later worked with Israel Defense Forces Unit 8200, known as Israel’s
functional equivalent of the NSA, developed the code. Once the code was put
together, it was passed to the CIA for implementation.
Zetter writes that there was some
hand-wringing from George W. Bush administration officials about implementing
the program. But the wariness had less to do with the sabotage they hoped to
inflict on Iran than with the possibility that the NSA’s offensive
cyber-capability might, for the first time, be exposed. “The problem with using
a cyberweapon,” Zetter writes, quoting a former CIA agent, is that “once it’s
out there, its like using your stealth fighter for the first time — you’ve rung
that bell and you can’t pretend that the stealth fighter doesn’t exist
anymore.”
Which leads to the biggest surprise
in the book — that there haven’t been more cyberattacks like Stuxnet. Zetter
believes that the worm was so successful that other, similar cyberattacks may
be only a matter of time. But as far as we know, they haven’t happened yet.
That said, after reading the immensely enjoyable “Countdown to Zero Day,”
whenever I run across a news account of a computer malfunction, I wonder, might
it be a zero-day attack in disguise?
In a top-secret October 2012 presidential
directive leaked by former NSA contractor Edward Snowden, Obama ordered senior
national security and intelligence officials to produce a list of foreign
targets — systems, processes and infrastructures — for possible cyberattack in
the future. The age of digital warfare may well have begun.
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