The Marines’ Stealth Jump Jet Plan Is Wishful Thinking
By Bill Sweetman in Aviation
Week
USMC generals say they absolutely
have to have their mega-expensive F-35B. But their idea on how to use it is
problematic—at best.
The F-35B, the Marine Corps version of
the stealthy Joint Strike Fighter, has the shortest range and the smallest
payload of any of the F-35 variants. It’s also the most expensive, with a unit
price tag of $140 million, not including R&D. The Marines’ requirements—to
do short-takeoff, vertical-landing (STOVL) and fit aboard the ships the Corps
uses—dictated the use of a single engine and drove the internal layout of the
fuselage.
Marine Corps leaders have been
confident that the F-35B alone will deliver strategic options that justify its
price and its impact on the Air Force and Navy versions. That’s a tall order. A
Marine expeditionary force is organized around a single amphibious warfare
ship, classified as an LHA or an LHD. These are 50,000-ton warships but they
have to carry Marines, their equipment, and helicopters as well as jet
fighters. Normally, the air combat element includes just six Harrier “jump
jets,” and no force of six aircraft has won a war yet.
The idea behind the Marine Harrier
force has always been that it can expand beyond the ship’s capacity, by using
shore bases that other fighters cannot reach: short civilian runways or even
stretches of road. This kind of operation has been performed by the Marines, in
combat, exactly three times in the 40-year history of the Harrier force.
The question today is a simple one:
What scenario can we contemplate where you need supersonic, stealthy multi-role
fighters, but you don’t need the full carrier air wing? In the past few months,
the Marines have rolled out some potential answers.
Corps commandant Gen. Joseph Dunford
told a House defense appropriations subcommittee in late February that a
shipboard detachment of four to eight F-35Bs would deliver “the same kind of
access” in “high-risk regions” as a joint strike package today that would
include “cruise missiles, fighter aircraft, electronic-warfare platforms,
aircraft which specialize in suppression and destruction of enemy air defenses,
and strike aircraft.” The F-35 detachment is “a day-one, full-spectrum
capability against the most critical and prohibitive threats,” Dunford said.
On land, the Marines would use a new
concept of operations known as distributed STOVL operations (DSO), said Lt.
Gen. Jon Davis, Marine deputy commandant for aviation. The idea behind DSO is
to obtain the advantages of forward basing—deeper reach and faster
response—while keeping people, aircraft and equipment on the ground safe from
counterattack from threats that are likely to include guided tactical ballistic
missiles.
The idea
behind the Marine Harrier force has always been that it can expand beyond the
ship’s capacity, by using shore bases that other fighters cannot reach. This
kind of operation has been performed by the Marines, in combat, exactly three
times in the 40-year history of the Harrier force.
Mobility is the key. The plan calls
for mobile forward arming and refueling points—improvised bases that supply
fuel, ammunition, and the minimum support necessary to turn jets between
sorties. The idea is that they can moved around the theater inside the adversary’s
targeting cycle—assumed to be 24-48 hours—so that they can survive without
being accompanied by anti-missile defenses. Decoy bases would be established to
complicate the enemy’s targeting problem.
Both the small shipboard unit and
the DSO idea have obvious problems.
Dunford’s eight-aircraft detachment
would be kept very busy sustaining combat air patrols, providing
over-the-horizon intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and
performing close air support and strike. Britain’s new aircraft carriers are
70,000-ton ships because the operations analysts calculated that a stand-alone
air wing would need 24 aircraft to cover those missions.
Without a carrier, Dunford’s force
has no persistent ISR or airborne early warning—and any nation qualifying as a
high-risk threat will have anti-ship cruise missiles on fast attack craft, on
trucks or masked in commercial containers. Airborne early warning was invented
in World War II in the Pacific, because by the time the kamikazes appeared on
the horizon, it was too late for an effective defense. The same goes for this
new breed of cruise missiles.
DSO sounds like an adventure in
logistics. The Marines’ biggest wartime off-base Harrier operation, in 1991
during Desert Storm, was supported by 45 8,000-gallon tanker trucks, and the
F-35B is more than twice the Harrier’s size. Davis envisages that in some
cases, the new improvised base will be supplied by KC-130J tankers—but each
sortie will deliver five F-35B-loads of fuel at best. As was finally confirmed in
the run-up to last
year’s Farnborough air show, the F-35’s exhaust is tough on runways: Many
tons of metal planking will be needed to protect poor-quality runways or roads,
even in a rolling vertical landing. It will have to be moved on the same cycle
as the rest of the mobile base.
Force protection could be a
challenge. The mobile base will need either a huge sanitized zone or its own
active defense against rockets, mortars, and shoulder-fired anti-aircraft
missiles, which no practical decoy or jammer will distract from the F-35B’s
exhaust.
These ambitious operational concepts
should be tested, in force-level exercises against an aggressive and
independent Red team, before we get much further into the $48 billion F-35B
procurement. There could be no better use for the first F-35B squadron, once
Marine leaders declare it ready for combat later this year.
Bill Sweetman is an editor for Aviation Week where another
version of this article originally appeared.
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