China’s Antigraft Drive Exposes Military Risks

China’s Antigraft Drive Exposes Military Risks

Takedown of generals shines light on rampant buying of ranks

By Jeremy Page and Lingling Wei in the Wall Street Journal

BEIJING—A drive against corruption in China’s military that has taken down at least 30 generals is exposing a problem that insiders and experts say could severely hamper the armed forces’ ability to fight: the rampant buying and selling of military ranks.

So widespread was the trade in ranks in the past decade that they came attached with unofficial price tags, with promotion to general costing at least 10 million yuan ($1.6 million) and to senior colonel more than half that, current and retired officers say. Even just enlisting as an ordinary soldier could cost 10,000 yuan in bribes, they say.

“It had become a vicious cycle,” said a retired Chinese officer, with officers who had paid for promotion looking to recoup their investment. The practice, he said, was “pervasive throughout the entire army in the past 10 years.”

President Xi Jinping has trained a wide-ranging antigraft campaign on the People’s Liberation Army, both to stamp his authority on the armed forces and shape a modern military capable of protecting China’s global interests—an agenda of prime concern for China’s neighbors as well as the U.S.

But the sheer number and seniority of officers detained or arrested thus far raise questions about the combat potential of a military that hasn’t fought a war in more than three decades, defense experts and insiders say. Officers detained recently span the army, navy and second artillery, which controls China’s nuclear deterrent, and include a general whose father is a former deputy military chief.

 “If you can’t depend on the military personnel system to select the best and most competent officers, especially for key operational positions, then trust and respect for the chain of command begins to get eroded,” said Tai Ming Cheung, an expert on the Chinese military at the University of California, San Diego. “When that happens, discipline begins to get undermined and it can quickly become a systemic issue that can rot away at the whole military apparatus.”

China’s defense ministry didn’t respond to a request for comment on the officers detained, the trade in ranks and the effect on operational capabilities

The scale of the problem also underlines the political risks Mr. Xi faces in targeting so many senior commanders. The armed forces are technically controlled by an 11-man Central Military Commission with Mr. Xi as chairman and only civilian.

Retired Maj. Gen. Yang Chunchang said in an interview this week with Hong Kong’s Phoenix Satellite Television, which has close ties to Beijing, that military graft had been so severe under Mr. Xi’s predecessor, Hu Jintao, that he had little control over the armed forces.

“It made the No. 1 leader of the military commission into a mere figurehead,” said Gen. Yang, one of several current and former officers who have spoken out on military corruption this week during an annual session of the national legislature.

He also said it was an open secret that different ranks in the military and armed police carried “price tags,” though he said the problem didn’t affect the entire armed forces.

‘It is widely believed that positions in and promotions within the PLA can be bought’

—Rand Corp.

Last month, the research firm Rand Corp. published a report on the Chinese military which said: “It is widely believed that positions in and promotions within the PLA can be bought (and often have to be).”

Though the impact of corruption is difficult to assess precisely, the report said, it likely undermines professionalism and affects combat capabilities. The corruption crackdown, it said, also risked weakening the military by denting morale and toppling officers who, although corrupt, were also effective commanders.

The most senior military figure formally accused of selling military posts is former Gen. Xu Caihou, one of two uniformed vice chairmen of the military commission when President Hu led it from 2004 to 2012. Official media said in October, Gen. Xu had confessed to taking “extremely large” bribes to help promote others.

Gen. Xu couldn’t be contacted for comment, and it isn’t known if he haslegal representation.

Senior military officers briefed on Gen. Xu’s case were told that he and his family received about 40 million yuan ($6.4 million) in bribes from a protégé, Lt Gen. Gu Junshan, according to a person with direct knowledge of the briefing.

Gen Gu, formerly deputy chief of the military’s logistics department, was charged last March with bribery, embezzlement, misusing state funds and abuse of power, according to official media, which also said he had sold military posts. It hasn’t been possible to contact him or a legal representative.

Two other senior PLA officers who were recently detained are also suspected of having bribed Gen. Xu in exchange for promotion, according to two senior military officers with knowledge of the cases.

Those two cases were among 16 senior officers—including four lieutenant generals and nine major generals—who were placed under investigation last year, according to an announcement from the Chinese military in January.

Most handled logistics or were commissars in charge of maintaining political reliability rather than operations. But a commentary from the official Xinhua News Agency acknowledged that “graft in the armed forces could undermine their ability on the battlefield”.

This month, Chinese official media announced investigations into 14 more generals including Guo Zhenggang. He was identified by state newspapers as the son of retired Gen. Guo Boxiong, vice chairman of the military commission from 2002 to 2012.

Gen. Guo Boxiong hasn't been accused of wrongdoing. Neither he, his son or any legal representatives could be reached for comment.

One senior military figure suggested this week that Gen. Guo should be held responsible for his son’s actions, according to state media.

“If the father is in the military, and the son also joins, there’s nothing wrong with that,” retired Maj. Gen. Liu Jian—the grandson of Marshal Zhu De, a founder of the PLA—was quoted as saying on a news site affiliated with the Communist Youth League. “But if it reaches a certain point where you use the power in your hands to profit yourself and others, that’s not right. Also, parents are their children’s first teachers. If the child is not well educated, the parents can’t escape blame.”

Analysts say that targeting both former Gen. Xu and the son of retired Gen. Guo serves to signal that military corruption was out of control under President Hu, and to justify President Xi’s stronger-handed leadership.

Corruption in the military became widespread in the 1980s as it branched out into business, seeing opportunity in the new market reforms. Chinese leaders ordered it to withdraw from commercial activities in 1998. In the 2000s, though, graft flared anew, due in part to soaring value of land for development, including military land, insiders and analysts say.

Military housing and weapons procurement have been particularly rife with graft, those people say.

Some Chinese officers have drawn comparisons with the waning years of the last imperial dynasty, the Qing, arguing that military corruption was one of the main reasons for China’s defeat by Japan and the British.

Roy Kamphausen, a former U.S. military attaché in Beijing, said the buying of promotions appeared to become more prevalent in recent years, as corruption at large increased. One factor, he said, was a 360-degree evaluation system in the military, which meant that subordinates, peers and even superiors could all benefit from an officer’s promotion.