By Lyle J. Goldstein in The National Interest
Entering the Second World War, the
United States dramatically underestimated the effectiveness of certain Japanese
naval systems and operations. The tendency to look askance at Japanese
naval prowess during the interwar period obviously impacted the failure to
anticipate the Pearl Harbor attack. But it is less widely understood that
U.S. intelligence similarly underestimated the strength of Japan’s primary
naval fighter aircraft (the Zero), the dramatic effectiveness of its long-range
torpedoes, nor its dedication to mastering difficult, but essential operations
such as night combat. Remarkably, these problems in assessment occurred despite a
plethora of openly available information regarding Japanese naval development
during that time [4].
There are many reasons, of course,
that contemporary China’s maritime ascendancy is starkly different from that of
Imperial Japan almost a century ago. In particular, there is hardly a
shred of evidence (reef reclamation included) to suggest that Beijing is
inclined to undertake a rampage of conquest similar to Japan’s effort to bring
the whole of the Asia-Pacific to heel from 1931 to 1942. Still, the
complex maritime disputes in the Western Pacific require that American
strategists keep a close eye on the evolving military balance. In that
spirit, this installment of the Dragon Eye series turns once again to
focus a bright light on one of the newest elements of China’s missile arsenal:
the YJ-18 anti-ship cruise missile (ASCM).
A test of the new Chinese YJ-18 supersonic ASCM
from November 2014 is visible in this video clip [5], about one minute into this segment introducing China’s
new nuclear submarine design. Even though we know that YJ-18 is part of a whole
new generation of new and lethal Chinese ASCMs, it is curious that Chinese
ASCMs generally go unmentioned in a recent TNI analysis of the “5 Most Deadly Anti-Ship Missiles of All Time [6].” Clearly, Chinese naval analysts, who have
labeled the YJ-18 in an early 2015 analysis “最完美的反舰导弹” [the most perfect ASCM] would not
agree with that rendering. A Chinese analysis of the YJ-18 appearing in the naval magazine 舰船知识 [Naval & Merchant
Ships] published by the China State Shipbuilding Corporation (CSSC) in February
2015 [7] is the main basis of this Dragon
Eye discussion.
However, before turning to the
insights from this recent Chinese analysis, let us return briefly to what has
been revealed about this new missile from both the recent U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence
(ONI) report [8], as well as the annual Pentagon report on Chinese military
power [9]. The ONI report is
generally well done, but curiously the new YJ-18 only rates a mention in two
spare sentences. This report notes that the YJ-18 can be
vertically-launched (generally from a surface combatant) or alternatively
submarine-launched, but there is no discussion of its supersonic sprint
vehicle. Since the U.S. Navy (USN) lacks a supersonic ASCM and will not
have one in the foreseeable future, this omission is troubling. Similarly
puzzling is the decision not to discuss the recent appearance of another
supersonic ASCM, YJ-12, in China’s arsenal. True, such capabilities did exist
earlier in other forms, namely as imported Russian systems, but the
indigenization (and likely upgrade) of these capabilities is hardly
insignificant and will mean they are much more widespread and employed with
greater confidence and proficiency.
The 2015 Department of Defense
report does offer a bit more detail and thus draws the proper attention to the
YJ-18 threat, but again does not mention its supersonic sprint vehicle.
The YJ-18 ASCM is described as a “significant step” and subsequently as a
“dramatic improvement” over current missiles in China’s inventory.
Perhaps most significantly, however, the DoD report puts the range of
YJ-18 at 290 nautical miles – more than double that of its likely progenitor,
the Russian SS-N-27 Klub ASCM (export version). If correct,
moreover, this new range will, in the near term, more or less quadruple the
range of the standard ASCM fired from most PLA Navy submarines.
The February 2015 Chinese analysis
of YJ-18 is somewhat cautious in tone and hardly purports to be a comprehensive
analysis. Perhaps fitting for an initial piece on a cutting edge system,
the article’s introduction sports the rare caveat “…并不代表本刊观点” [does not represent the viewpoint
of this magazine]. However, the title “‘鹰击’18 -- ‘俱乐部’导弹中国版?”
[Is the Yingji-18 Simply a Chinese Version of the Klub?] asks the
precise question that will be on the minds of many defense analysts examining
the YJ-18. A decent amount of the article just reviews the development of
the Russian Klub system and its different variants. It is noted,
moreover, that China has had ready access to the Klub missile system
since it imported the Type 636 Kilo-class conventional subs about a decade ago.
Indeed, some had remarked that Beijing imported the submarine for the
sole purpose of actually acquiring its superior missile system.
Interestingly, the article does not report the much extended range
outlined in the new Pentagon report.
This Chinese description relates
that the missile’s great strength is its “亚超结合的独特动力” [subsonic and supersonic combined unique propulsion].
Another term applied to this design is “双速制反舰导弹” [dual speed control ASCM].
As explained in the article, it is projected that YJ-18 would have an
initial subsonic phase estimated at .8 Mach similar to the Klub of about 180km,
but 20km from the target would unleash the supersonic sprint vehicle at speed
of Mach 2.5 to 3. The “dual speed” function allows the system to realize
certain advantages of subsonic cruise missiles, such as their “relatively long
range, light weight and universality …” but also takes the chief advantage of
supersonic ASCMs as well, namely the ability to “大幅压缩敌方的反应时间” [radically compress the enemy’s
reaction time].
The Chinese article relates another
advantage of the “dual speed” approach. Just as the missile comes into
contact with the ship’s defenses, it “sheds the medium stage …,” thus
simultaneously and dramatically altering both its speed and also its radar
reflection, “which would impact the fire control calculation.” The
likelihood that YJ-18 improves upon the Klub missile’s “digitization,
automation, as well as providing more intelligent flight control and navigation
technology” is attributed in the Chinese article to a recent Jane’s
report. A final interesting issue raised in the Chinese article concerns the
“hot launch” technique suggested in the test video clip mentioned at the outset
of this article (and illustrated in photos accompanying the Chinese article).
Indeed, a new vertical launch system for the new 052D destroyer is confirmed as
a “共架混装” [common rack for mixed arms]
system with a citation in the article to PLA Admiral Qiu Zhiming, director of
the Naval Armaments Research Academy. But it is not clear from the
article that YJ-18 will rely on the hot launch versus the cold launch
method--the latter being much more common for submarine launched missiles.
The article interestingly discusses
recent Russian placement of additional Kilo-class submarines equipped
with the Klub-missile systems into the Black Sea. These new
submarines “based on the Crimean Peninsula, operating in harmony with air and
land-based missile forces [can] … limit the deployment of NATO fleets into the
Black Sea …” I have noted before in this column the seductive possibilities of the “Russian
model” for Chinese strategists
[10]. This Chinese author concludes the piece, explaining that, “The YJ-18 will
gradually replace the YJ-82 across the PLA Navy submarine fleet. That
development combined with surface ship and air-launched missiles will create a
comprehensive attack system of even greater combat power.” The
implication seems to be that for China, in its various maritime disputes, the
YJ-18 can play a role similar to the one that nearly identical Russian weapons
have played in creating decisive local military superiority in the Black Sea
area.
On the other hand, Beijing has been
making noteworthy strides in military transparency of late, for example with
the most recent white paper [11] or the somewhat unusual discussion of the new Type
093G nuclear attack submarine in China Daily
[12]. Nevertheless, the gap in transparency continues to be quite wide
when it comes to some of the most lethal weapons in China’s arsenal, such as
the new YJ-18. Allowing the rumor mill to churn, spreading anxieties
regarding Chinese capabilities hither and thither is really not in China’s
interest and greater transparency, of course, is necessary.
For Washington, some additional
attention seems warranted in future intelligence community studies with respect
to Chinese ASCM development. The 2015 ONI study gave some attention to YJ-18,
but omitted discussion of the supersonic YJ-12, the long-range subsonic YJ-100 [13] or the CX-1 supersonic ASCM that are apparently now
in development [14], according to Chinese sources.
Renewed attention will help muster the necessary focus for the U.S. going
forward to prepare its forces adequately. For all the ink spilled and
Washington seminars convened to discuss China’s expanding coast guard fleet, it
is obviously the ever-growing sophistication of the Chinese ASCM arsenal that
poses the “clear and present danger” to American sailors.
Lyle J. Goldstein [15] is Associate Professor in the China Maritime Studies Institute [16] (CMSI) at the U.S. Naval War College [17] in Newport, RI. The opinions expressed in this
analysis are his own and do not represent the official assessments of the U.S.
Navy or any other agency of the U.S. Government.
Editor’s Note: The following is part
of a unique series we call Dragon Eye, which seeks insight and analysis from
Chinese writings on world affairs. You can find all previous articles in the
series here
[2].
Source URL (retrieved on June 1,
2015): http://nationalinterest.org/feature/chinas-yj-18-supersonic-anti-ship-cruise-missile-americas-13010
Links:
[1] http://nationalinterest.org/feature/chinas-yj-18-supersonic-anti-ship-cruise-missile-americas-13010
[2] http://nationalinterest.org/profile/lyle-j-goldstein
[3] http://twitter.com/share
[4] http://www.cornellpress.cornell.edu/book/?GCOI=80140100004030
[5] http://video.sina.com.cn/p/news/mil/v/2015-02-16/073764629783.html
[6] http://nationalinterest.org/feature/bull%E2%80%99s-eye-the-5-most-deadly-anti-ship-missiles-all-time-12411
[7] http://mil.news.sina.com.cn/nz/jczs/
[8] http://www.oni.navy.mil/Intelligence_Community/china_media/2015_PLA_NAVY_PUB_Interactive.pdf
[9] http://www.defense.gov/pubs/2015_China_Military_Power_Report.pdf
[10] http://nationalinterest.org/feature/get-ready-will-china-pull-crimea-asia-12605
[11] http://eng.mod.gov.cn/Database/WhitePapers/
[12] http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2015-04/03/content_19989094.htm
[13] http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-real-military-threat-china-anti-ship-cruise-missiles-12085
[14] http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/sale-china%E2%80%99s-mach-3-anti-ship-missile-11763
[15] https://www.usnwc.edu/Academics/Faculty/Lyle-Goldstein.aspx
[16] https://www.usnwc.edu/Research---Gaming/China-Maritime-Studies-Institute.aspx
[17] https://www.usnwc.edu/
[18] http://nationalinterest.org/tag/china
[19] http://nationalinterest.org/tag/chinas-navy
[20] http://nationalinterest.org/tag/yj-18-anti-ship-cruise-missile
[21] http://nationalinterest.org/topic/security
[22] http://nationalinterest.org/region/asia
[1] http://nationalinterest.org/feature/chinas-yj-18-supersonic-anti-ship-cruise-missile-americas-13010
[2] http://nationalinterest.org/profile/lyle-j-goldstein
[3] http://twitter.com/share
[4] http://www.cornellpress.cornell.edu/book/?GCOI=80140100004030
[5] http://video.sina.com.cn/p/news/mil/v/2015-02-16/073764629783.html
[6] http://nationalinterest.org/feature/bull%E2%80%99s-eye-the-5-most-deadly-anti-ship-missiles-all-time-12411
[7] http://mil.news.sina.com.cn/nz/jczs/
[8] http://www.oni.navy.mil/Intelligence_Community/china_media/2015_PLA_NAVY_PUB_Interactive.pdf
[9] http://www.defense.gov/pubs/2015_China_Military_Power_Report.pdf
[10] http://nationalinterest.org/feature/get-ready-will-china-pull-crimea-asia-12605
[11] http://eng.mod.gov.cn/Database/WhitePapers/
[12] http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2015-04/03/content_19989094.htm
[13] http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-real-military-threat-china-anti-ship-cruise-missiles-12085
[14] http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/sale-china%E2%80%99s-mach-3-anti-ship-missile-11763
[15] https://www.usnwc.edu/Academics/Faculty/Lyle-Goldstein.aspx
[16] https://www.usnwc.edu/Research---Gaming/China-Maritime-Studies-Institute.aspx
[17] https://www.usnwc.edu/
[18] http://nationalinterest.org/tag/china
[19] http://nationalinterest.org/tag/chinas-navy
[20] http://nationalinterest.org/tag/yj-18-anti-ship-cruise-missile
[21] http://nationalinterest.org/topic/security
[22] http://nationalinterest.org/region/asia
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