From Sochi
to Sudan, 10 conflicts that will threaten global stability in 2014.
Before we dive into next year's list of conflicts to watch, some
thoughts on the year we are about to conclude are in order. In short, 2013 was
not a good year for our collective ability to prevent or end conflict. For
sure, there were bright moments. Colombia appears closer than ever to
ending a civil war which next year will mark its
60th birthday. Myanmar, too, could bring down the curtain on its
decades-long internal ethnic conflicts, though many hurdles remain. The
deal struck over Iran's nuclear program was a welcome fillip for diplomacy,
even dynamism. The U.N. Security Council finally broke its deadlock over
Syria, at least with regards to the regime's chemical weapons, and committed to
more robust interventions in Eastern Congo and the Central African Republic.
Turkey's talks with the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) continue in fits and
starts, but the ceasefire looks reasonably durable. Pakistan enjoyed its
first-ever democratic handover of power.
As important as these achievements are, still more important is
to keep them in perspective. Colombia's peace process remains vulnerable
to messy domestic politics in the election year ahead. Myanmar's positive
trajectory could derail if the bigotry unleashed on Muslim communities
continues unchecked. Moving towards a final settlement with Iran amidst a
sea of red lines and potential spoilers -- in Washington, Tehran, and the
region -- is undoubtedly a more perilous challenge than reaching the interim
deal in Geneva, welcome step though it was. And that Turkey and Pakistan, both
entries on last year's "top 10" list, don't make it onto this year's
list is hardly a clean bill of health, given the spillover of Syria's conflict
into Turkey, and the ongoing dangers of extremism and urban violence in
Pakistan.
But it is Syria and the recent muscular interventions in Central
Africa that best illustrate alarming deficiencies in our collective ability to
manage conflict.
In Syria, the speed and decisiveness with which the
international community acted to eliminate Bashar al-Assad's chemical weapons
can't help but underscore its failure to act with equal determination to end
the fighting; even concerted humanitarian action remains elusive. As the
conflict in Syria enters its third winter, there is little indication it will
stop any time soon, whatever hopes are centered around the Geneva talks scheduled
for January. If the Security Council's role is to maintain international
peace and security, then as Syria's conflict claims ever more lives and
threatens to suck in Lebanon and Iraq, how else can one judge its impact than
as an abject failure?
In the Central African Republic, meanwhile, the international
community was apparently taken by surprise by the collapse into violence. There
is no excuse for this: Decades of misrule, under-development, and economic
mismanagement had left behind a phantom state long before this year's coup
unleashed turmoil and now escalating confessional violence. France's robust
support for the African Union (AU) in a full-fledged humanitarian intervention
was commendable. But without concerted, sustained commitment to rebuilding
the Central African Republic (CAR), it is unlikely to make much difference in
the long run.
So how does this list compared with that of last year? Five
entries are new: Bangladesh, Central African Republic, Honduras, Libya, and
North Caucasus. Five remain: Central Asia, Iraq, the Sahel, Sudan, and
Syria/Lebanon. Of course, by their nature, lists beget lists. It would not have
been too difficult to draw up a completely different one. In addition to
Pakistan and Turkey, Afghanistan, Somalia, and the Democratic Republic of the
Congo (DRC) have been omitted, though all could have easily merited a place.
Nor did South Sudan, apparently on the cusp of civil war, make it onto this year's list.
In Afghanistan, next year's elections, coupled with the
Taliban's continued insurgency in the face of unsettled international support
for a still nascent national army, make 2014 a crucial year for the country --
and a potentially ominous one for Afghan women. In Somalia, despite some gains
by an AU mission and a new "provisional" government, al-Shabab
militants have shown their continued ability to strike -- both at home and
abroad -- and many of Somalia's clans remain in conflict with each other.
Finally, the sheer absence of the state and the rule of law in the DRC could
have justified an entry on this year's list, despite the recent welcome defeat
of the M23 rebel movement and signs that, finally, the international community
can no longer ignore the conflict's regional dimensions.
But ultimately, this list seeks to focus not just on crises in
the international spotlight -- CAR, Syria, the Sahel, and Sudan -- but also on
some that are less visible or slower-burning. Thus Honduras -- estimated to be
the world's most violent country outside those facing conventional conflict --
is included, as is Central Asia, which totters ever closer to a political and
security implosion.
The list illustrates the remarkable range of factors that can
cause instability: organized crime in Central America; the stresses of the
political competition around elections, as in Bangladesh; the threat of
insurgency -- in the North Caucasus, for example -- or the dangers of regional
spillover, as in Lebanon or the Sahel. Then there are the perils of
authoritarian rule and an overly securitized response to opposition: in Syria,
of course, but also in Iraq and Russia's North Caucasus. An alarming rise in
communal or identity-based violence is likewise contributing to instability in
Iraq, Syria, and CAR (and Myanmar and Sri Lanka, for that matter). Finally,
center/periphery tensions cut across a range of countries on the list. Mali,
Libya, Sudan, and Iraq -- plus Afghanistan, Somalia, Yemen and others -- all
wrestle with notions of strong, centralized governance that appear unworkable,
yet struggle to find alternatives that don't atomize the state or feed
secessionism.
Above all, however, the list highlights that deadly conflict
rarely springs up out of nowhere or is entirely unanticipated. It usually
has long roots: in underdevelopment; states' inability to provide all their
citizens with basic public goods; inequality; and divisive or predatory rule.
It shows, too, that reducing the fragility of the most vulnerable countries --
arguably among the greatest moral and political challenge of our era -- takes
time, commitment, and resources. Three things that, sadly, too often are
lacking.
The diplomatic breakthrough in September on Syria's chemical
weapons -- and subsequent progress in dismantling them -- has had little
noticeable impact on the battlefield. Violence continues, with ever-worsening
humanitarian consequences. Having avoided a U.S. military intervention, the
Bashar al-Assad regime has displayed increasing confidence, re-escalating its
campaign to drive rebels from strongholds around the capital, Aleppo, and the
Lebanese border. The regime, with some success, has also sought to market
itself to Western governments as a counterterrorism partner -- ironically so,
given that its brutal tactics and reliance on sectarian militias helped fuel
the rise of its extremist adversaries in the first place.
In part, the regime's momentum -- however limited -- can be attributed to disarray among rebel forces. The opposition's primary political umbrella, the National Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces, has no real control of military operations on the ground. The opposition's regional backers -- principally Saudi Arabia and Qatar -- support competing blocs within the coalition, as well as separate armed groups outside it, contributing to rifts that jihadi groups have exploited. The al Qaeda-affiliated Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) is now the strongest rebel faction in much of the north, but its aggressive tactics have alienated fellow militants and the opposition's base. In response, other leading rebel groups formed the "Islamic Front," potentially the largest and most coherent opposition alliance to date. Its Islamist platform, however, has raised concerns among some of the opposition's external backers, and coordination issues remain a persistent problem.
Meanwhile, Syria is slowly but surely dragging Lebanon down with it. Lebanon's population has swelled by at least 25 percent as a result of Syrian spillover. Meanwhile, Hezbollah's growing involvement on the regime's behalf, allegedly in a "pre-emptive war" to keep its jihadist enemies at bay, is in fact luring them to take the fight to the Shiite militant group at home. Other attacks have targeted Sunni mosques in Tripoli, where sectarian strife has pushed the army to take control.
International attention is currently focused on the renewed push to hold talks between the regime and opposition, scheduled for Jan. 22 in Geneva. But both sides see it as little more than a venue for the other to formalize its capitulation. The opposition coalition accepts the premise of the talks -- the June 2012 Geneva communiqué calling for establishment of a mutually agreed transitional body with full executive authority -- but has struggled to make a final decision about whether to participate under current conditions. The regime, by contrast, has readily agreed to join talks, but rejects the ostensible goal of the process: the formation of a transitional government. The positions of each side's external backers will be critical in bringing the parties toward agreement in any political process, but here, too, signs of willingness to compromise are few, if any.
In part, the regime's momentum -- however limited -- can be attributed to disarray among rebel forces. The opposition's primary political umbrella, the National Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces, has no real control of military operations on the ground. The opposition's regional backers -- principally Saudi Arabia and Qatar -- support competing blocs within the coalition, as well as separate armed groups outside it, contributing to rifts that jihadi groups have exploited. The al Qaeda-affiliated Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) is now the strongest rebel faction in much of the north, but its aggressive tactics have alienated fellow militants and the opposition's base. In response, other leading rebel groups formed the "Islamic Front," potentially the largest and most coherent opposition alliance to date. Its Islamist platform, however, has raised concerns among some of the opposition's external backers, and coordination issues remain a persistent problem.
Meanwhile, Syria is slowly but surely dragging Lebanon down with it. Lebanon's population has swelled by at least 25 percent as a result of Syrian spillover. Meanwhile, Hezbollah's growing involvement on the regime's behalf, allegedly in a "pre-emptive war" to keep its jihadist enemies at bay, is in fact luring them to take the fight to the Shiite militant group at home. Other attacks have targeted Sunni mosques in Tripoli, where sectarian strife has pushed the army to take control.
International attention is currently focused on the renewed push to hold talks between the regime and opposition, scheduled for Jan. 22 in Geneva. But both sides see it as little more than a venue for the other to formalize its capitulation. The opposition coalition accepts the premise of the talks -- the June 2012 Geneva communiqué calling for establishment of a mutually agreed transitional body with full executive authority -- but has struggled to make a final decision about whether to participate under current conditions. The regime, by contrast, has readily agreed to join talks, but rejects the ostensible goal of the process: the formation of a transitional government. The positions of each side's external backers will be critical in bringing the parties toward agreement in any political process, but here, too, signs of willingness to compromise are few, if any.
Since April 2013, when Nouri al-Maliki's Shiite-led government intensified its violent crackdown on
a peaceful Sunni protest movement, the tide of attacks, arrests, and executions
has gradually swelled. Sunni distrust of the central government is greater than
ever, providing an opening for al Qaeda in Iraq after years of decline. Over
7,000 civilians have fallen victim to this destructive cycle already this year,
but still the government has shown no appetite for compromise. Iraq's Sunnis,
therefore, have turned to Syria, hoping a victory by the opposition there will
enable a political comeback at home.
The coming year is likely to see further intertwining of the Iraqi and Syrian conflicts. As the Iraqi state weakens, its frontier with Syria erodes. Baghdad, more overtly than ever, is aiding Damascus in order to stave off the Sunni wave it fears at home -- though its support for the Syrian regime is encouraging precisely that, as the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), an al Qaeda offshoot, has become the biggest player in northern Syria. To halt the violence, the Iraqi government should change its approach radically: It must win Iraqi Sunnis back to its side, re-engage them in the political process and in the fight against al Qaeda, and use its improved domestic support base to secure its own borders. Only an inclusive state can save Iraq from fragmenting.
The coming year's parliamentary elections are unlikely to produce solutions. On the contrary, they risk exacerbating violence and attracting foreign interference. Maliki's ambition to run for a third term pits his coalition against other Shiite groups, encouraging Iran to weigh in. At the same time, the political scene is fragmenting into a variety of political entities, the culmination of eight years of Maliki's divide-and-rule strategy. The prime minister's base has dwindled as well, so absent an unexpectedly dominant candidate or coalition, one can expect the elections to yield an excruciating period of bargaining and political paralysis.
The coming year is likely to see further intertwining of the Iraqi and Syrian conflicts. As the Iraqi state weakens, its frontier with Syria erodes. Baghdad, more overtly than ever, is aiding Damascus in order to stave off the Sunni wave it fears at home -- though its support for the Syrian regime is encouraging precisely that, as the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), an al Qaeda offshoot, has become the biggest player in northern Syria. To halt the violence, the Iraqi government should change its approach radically: It must win Iraqi Sunnis back to its side, re-engage them in the political process and in the fight against al Qaeda, and use its improved domestic support base to secure its own borders. Only an inclusive state can save Iraq from fragmenting.
The coming year's parliamentary elections are unlikely to produce solutions. On the contrary, they risk exacerbating violence and attracting foreign interference. Maliki's ambition to run for a third term pits his coalition against other Shiite groups, encouraging Iran to weigh in. At the same time, the political scene is fragmenting into a variety of political entities, the culmination of eight years of Maliki's divide-and-rule strategy. The prime minister's base has dwindled as well, so absent an unexpectedly dominant candidate or coalition, one can expect the elections to yield an excruciating period of bargaining and political paralysis.
Beset with myriad security concerns and mired in political
deadlock, Libya's post-Qaddafi transition is threatening to go off the rails.
The General National Congress' mandate is set to expire on Feb. 7, 2014,
and the formation of a constitution-writing body is already over a year late.
Ali Zeidan, the current prime minister, has been the target of several attacks
-- and a brief kidnapping -- and calls for his dismissal are rising. Meanwhile,
public confidence in state institutions is fast waning, and with it confidence
in a transition process that was supposed to create the framework for a new
democracy.
Like other Arab countries in transition, Libya has become increasingly divided along several different axes -- Islamist vs. liberal, conservative vs. revolutionary, and center vs. periphery -- all of which are contributing to instability on the ground. Following the collapse of Muammar al-Qaddafi's regime, militias largely took over from the official military and police force, and the country is awash in weapons. The coalition that brought Qaddafi's former allies together with liberal exiles and long-imprisoned Islamists has collapsed, leaving in its wake a fragmented polity. In Libya's east, almost daily targeted assassinations of security officials -- for which residents blame radical Islamists -- is fuelling belligerent anti-Islamist attitudes.
Like other Arab countries in transition, Libya has become increasingly divided along several different axes -- Islamist vs. liberal, conservative vs. revolutionary, and center vs. periphery -- all of which are contributing to instability on the ground. Following the collapse of Muammar al-Qaddafi's regime, militias largely took over from the official military and police force, and the country is awash in weapons. The coalition that brought Qaddafi's former allies together with liberal exiles and long-imprisoned Islamists has collapsed, leaving in its wake a fragmented polity. In Libya's east, almost daily targeted assassinations of security officials -- for which residents blame radical Islamists -- is fuelling belligerent anti-Islamist attitudes.
Overwhelmed, the government has been obliged, paradoxically, to
bribe and cajole militias in an attempt to rebuild the state's monopoly on
force. So far, it has had little success: Armed groups have blocked gas
pipelines and besieged crude oil facilities, reducing exports to around 20
percent of the pre-uprising level. The loss of revenues is crippling the
national budget.
There are no easy answers to these problems. At a minimum, local militias and the proliferation of small arms will plague Libya (and its neighbors) for years to come, frustrating the government's efforts to rebuild the country's security forces and secure its borders. But it remains an open question whether Libya's leaders can build sufficient consensus to keep the process moving in the right direction.
There are no easy answers to these problems. At a minimum, local militias and the proliferation of small arms will plague Libya (and its neighbors) for years to come, frustrating the government's efforts to rebuild the country's security forces and secure its borders. But it remains an open question whether Libya's leaders can build sufficient consensus to keep the process moving in the right direction.
Honduras is the world's murder capital, with more than 80
homicides reported for every 100,000 citizens in 2013. A weak, often
compromised justice and law enforcement system means that most serious crimes
are never prosecuted. One of the two poorest countries in the region -- half
the population lives in extreme poverty -- Honduras is also among the 10 most
unequal countries in the world. Much of the country is plagued by criminal
violence, and most Hondurans cannot access state services or enjoy the protection
of law enforcement. Democracy and rule of law -- never strong -- were further
undermined by a coup in 2009.
The United Nations and human rights groups have reported that members of the Honduran
National Police have engaged in criminal activity, including murder. Weak,
corrupt security forces have turned Honduras into an ideal way-station for
drugs heading from the Andes to U.S. markets. An estimated 87 percent of all airborne cocaine headed
north stops first in Honduras.
Organized criminal activity ranges from drug and human
trafficking to kidnapping and extortion. Criminal groups have become strong
enough that the state has effectively lost control over parts of the
country. Compounding these security threats are street gangs, led by the
Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) and Barrio 18 (M18), which together boast an estimated
12,000 members. For the most part, these gangs terrorize the poor, urban
neighborhoods in the capital city, Tegucigalpa, and the port of San Pedro Sula.
Violence in Honduras spiked upward in 2009, when President
Manuel Zelaya was ousted in a coup. The International Criminal Court is
currently investigating crimes committed in the aftermath of that coup, while
an official truth commission revealed that the military killed at least 20 people.
Since 2009, 10 human rights activists, 29 journalists, 63 lawyers, and some 20
political candidates have been killed. In almost all of these instances, no one
has been held accountable.
Newly elected President Juan Orlando Hernandez campaigned on an
"iron fist" response to crime, proposing to create a militarized
police force. Given ongoing complaints of human rights abuses by security
forces -- including allegations of involvement in disappearances and
kidnappings for ransom -- it is little surprise that his proposal has been met
with vocal opposition by civil society organizations and the diplomatic
community. Such an overly securitized response, built on corrupt or predatory
institutions, is unlikely to resolve the problem. Absent concerted efforts to
strengthen the rule of law, Honduras' plight looks set to continue -- even
intensify -- in the coming year.
Months of deadly clashes in the Central African Republic
(CAR) have brought an already perilously weak state to the brink of
collapse, with 400,000 people displaced and untold thousands terrorized into
hiding. Nearly half of the population is in need of some form of assistance,
and state services, including the police and the army, no longer exist.
It was just a year ago that a transition of power from then-President François Bozizé appeared to be in on track. But that agreement fell apart and in March, Seleka rebels -- a loose alliance of Muslim fighters from the CAR, Chad, and Sudan -- staged a coup to oust Bozizé and replace him with their leader, Michel Djotodia. In September, Djotodia disbanded Seleka, triggering a wave of widespread violence with no effective national army in place to stop it.
The United Nations and Western powers were slow to respond, in part because they thought Djotodia could control Seleka fighters and that the African Union-led International Support Mission in the CAR (MISCA) could secure the capital, Bangui. They were wrong on both counts. The transitional government and the regional security force have failed to prevent a free fall into chaos. The "wait and see" approach of the United Nations and Western powers now has them breathlessly trying to catch up.
The Seleka have since splintered into leaderless factions that clash regularly with armed groups made up of villagers and national security services alike. Eyewitnesses report daily attacks on civilians and massacres carried out with machetes and semi-automatic weapons. More worryingly still, the conflict has taken on a religious undercurrent, with the Seleka pitted against newly formed Christian self-defense groups. The process of radicalization is well underway. If the violence continues and religious tensions escalate, large-scale confessionally-driven violence is frighteningly possible.
The conflict could also easily spread to other neighboring countries -- insecurity is already rife on the border with Cameroon -- although help appears to be belatedly at hand. Following French warnings of potential regional destabilization, the United Nations authorized France to send 1,600 troops to bolster MISCA's operations and restore law and order. For now, the future of the CAR is in their hands. Challenges ahead include disarming militiamen in Bangui and preventing fighting between Christian and Muslim communities. Only then can the process of state-building begin.
It was just a year ago that a transition of power from then-President François Bozizé appeared to be in on track. But that agreement fell apart and in March, Seleka rebels -- a loose alliance of Muslim fighters from the CAR, Chad, and Sudan -- staged a coup to oust Bozizé and replace him with their leader, Michel Djotodia. In September, Djotodia disbanded Seleka, triggering a wave of widespread violence with no effective national army in place to stop it.
The United Nations and Western powers were slow to respond, in part because they thought Djotodia could control Seleka fighters and that the African Union-led International Support Mission in the CAR (MISCA) could secure the capital, Bangui. They were wrong on both counts. The transitional government and the regional security force have failed to prevent a free fall into chaos. The "wait and see" approach of the United Nations and Western powers now has them breathlessly trying to catch up.
The Seleka have since splintered into leaderless factions that clash regularly with armed groups made up of villagers and national security services alike. Eyewitnesses report daily attacks on civilians and massacres carried out with machetes and semi-automatic weapons. More worryingly still, the conflict has taken on a religious undercurrent, with the Seleka pitted against newly formed Christian self-defense groups. The process of radicalization is well underway. If the violence continues and religious tensions escalate, large-scale confessionally-driven violence is frighteningly possible.
The conflict could also easily spread to other neighboring countries -- insecurity is already rife on the border with Cameroon -- although help appears to be belatedly at hand. Following French warnings of potential regional destabilization, the United Nations authorized France to send 1,600 troops to bolster MISCA's operations and restore law and order. For now, the future of the CAR is in their hands. Challenges ahead include disarming militiamen in Bangui and preventing fighting between Christian and Muslim communities. Only then can the process of state-building begin.
A hotbed of instability and violence for years, conditions
remain dire across much of Sudan. Political restlessness in Khartoum,
economic fragility, and multiple center-periphery tensions all pose major
conflict risks for 2014.
In November, Sudan's defense minister announced a new offensive against Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF) rebels in South Kordofan, Darfur, and Blue Nile, aimed at "ending the rebellion." The rebel alliance, which is fighting for a more representative government, responded in kind, leveling attacks against strategic roads and army facilities in North and South Kordofan. Khartoum has since backpedaled, downplaying the significance of the campaign and saying the government is ready to resume talks. But African Union mediators still need Khartoum's consent to start a comprehensive, national dialogue that includes the SRF.
In Darfur, the violence that began a decade ago has now mostly given way to fighting between Arab tribes, once the government's main proxies against non-Arab rebels and communities. Since the beginning of 2013, inter-tribal violence has displaced an additional 450,000 people. One of the most violent conflicts in the region -- involving the Salamat, Missiriya, and Ta'aisha tribes at the Sudan-Chad-CAR tri-border -- has forced 50,000 more refugees into Chad. In the east of Sudan, lack of implementation of a 2006 peace deal backed by Eritrea is also threatening to reignite conflict.
In November, Sudan's defense minister announced a new offensive against Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF) rebels in South Kordofan, Darfur, and Blue Nile, aimed at "ending the rebellion." The rebel alliance, which is fighting for a more representative government, responded in kind, leveling attacks against strategic roads and army facilities in North and South Kordofan. Khartoum has since backpedaled, downplaying the significance of the campaign and saying the government is ready to resume talks. But African Union mediators still need Khartoum's consent to start a comprehensive, national dialogue that includes the SRF.
In Darfur, the violence that began a decade ago has now mostly given way to fighting between Arab tribes, once the government's main proxies against non-Arab rebels and communities. Since the beginning of 2013, inter-tribal violence has displaced an additional 450,000 people. One of the most violent conflicts in the region -- involving the Salamat, Missiriya, and Ta'aisha tribes at the Sudan-Chad-CAR tri-border -- has forced 50,000 more refugees into Chad. In the east of Sudan, lack of implementation of a 2006 peace deal backed by Eritrea is also threatening to reignite conflict.
Poor governance is also inching the country closer to disaster.
Nationwide protests in late September against ending fuel subsidies sparked
much deeper levels of discontent among urban populations, once reliable
government supporters. The growth of militant Islamist groups -- independent of
the governing National Congress Party or the Islamist Movement -- also points
to a government losing control on all fronts.
The solution to all of these challenges remains the same as ever: The relationship between Khartoum and the rest of the country must be fundamentally redefined. Otherwise, regional grievances will continue to fester, Khartoum will continue to be consumed with crisis management, and the international community will continue to spend billions each year to manage the consequences.
One of several obstacles that could stand in the way of reforming Sudan's centre-periphery troubles is President Omar al-Bashir's indictment for war crimes by the International Criminal Court (ICC). Without some incentive, Bashir could well block all but cosmetic change for fear of losing power and ending up at the court. But if the international community confirms that credible reform is underway -- and that the only thing standing in the way of further, comprehensive progress is the indictment -- the Security Council could request that the ICC defer prosecution of Bashir for a year with no obligation to extend.
The solution to all of these challenges remains the same as ever: The relationship between Khartoum and the rest of the country must be fundamentally redefined. Otherwise, regional grievances will continue to fester, Khartoum will continue to be consumed with crisis management, and the international community will continue to spend billions each year to manage the consequences.
One of several obstacles that could stand in the way of reforming Sudan's centre-periphery troubles is President Omar al-Bashir's indictment for war crimes by the International Criminal Court (ICC). Without some incentive, Bashir could well block all but cosmetic change for fear of losing power and ending up at the court. But if the international community confirms that credible reform is underway -- and that the only thing standing in the way of further, comprehensive progress is the indictment -- the Security Council could request that the ICC defer prosecution of Bashir for a year with no obligation to extend.
The Sahel region and Northern Nigeria have emerged as major sources
of instability for parts of West and Central Africa, as last year's
watchlist foretold. In 2014, expect separatist movements, Islamist terrorism,
and north-south tensions to continue to spark violence, which the region's weak
or stressed governments are ill-equipped to address.
In Mali, a French military intervention in early 2013 successfully wrested control of northern cities from a coalition of Islamist militant groups. Subsequently, presidential and parliamentary elections were held without major incident. Still, the country is far from stable today. Terror attacks, inter-communal clashes and bouts of fighting between armed Tuareg groups and the Malian army have continued, while representatives of the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), the primary Tuareg separatist group, have repeatedly threatened to withdraw from peace talks. A U.N. mission has deployed to the country, but still lacks adequate resources and personnel.
To escape further conflict, Mali must look beyond immediate security concerns and provide its diverse population with essential services, impartial justice, and inclusive politics. The government in Bamako cannot be seen as imposing its own vision for stability on the north -- or the roots of the conflict will remain untouched.
Next door, Niger may seem comparatively tranquil, but it is subject to many of the same pressures that tipped Mali into chaos. President Mahamadou Issoufou has pursued a security agenda focused on external threats, while his government is failing to deliver long promised and vital social goods at home. Tensions surrounding a government shuffle last summer revealed how fragile Niger's democracy remains. Add to the equation suspected criminal infiltration of the state and security services, the acute misery of most of the population, and you have a decidedly combustible mix.
Finally, Nigeria's Boko Haram continues to wage a bloody insurgency in the north of Africa's most populous country. Despite a year-long and often harsh government campaign, the group still mounts regular attacks on military and police installations, and civilians -- often from safe havens in the mountains, as well as from neighboring Niger and Cameroon. Fighting will claim further thousands of lives in 2014 unless the government adopts significant reforms, including addressing impunity, tackling systemic corruption, and promoting development. This will be made even more difficult as the country prepares for what could be fiercely contested general elections in 2015.
In Mali, a French military intervention in early 2013 successfully wrested control of northern cities from a coalition of Islamist militant groups. Subsequently, presidential and parliamentary elections were held without major incident. Still, the country is far from stable today. Terror attacks, inter-communal clashes and bouts of fighting between armed Tuareg groups and the Malian army have continued, while representatives of the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), the primary Tuareg separatist group, have repeatedly threatened to withdraw from peace talks. A U.N. mission has deployed to the country, but still lacks adequate resources and personnel.
To escape further conflict, Mali must look beyond immediate security concerns and provide its diverse population with essential services, impartial justice, and inclusive politics. The government in Bamako cannot be seen as imposing its own vision for stability on the north -- or the roots of the conflict will remain untouched.
Next door, Niger may seem comparatively tranquil, but it is subject to many of the same pressures that tipped Mali into chaos. President Mahamadou Issoufou has pursued a security agenda focused on external threats, while his government is failing to deliver long promised and vital social goods at home. Tensions surrounding a government shuffle last summer revealed how fragile Niger's democracy remains. Add to the equation suspected criminal infiltration of the state and security services, the acute misery of most of the population, and you have a decidedly combustible mix.
Finally, Nigeria's Boko Haram continues to wage a bloody insurgency in the north of Africa's most populous country. Despite a year-long and often harsh government campaign, the group still mounts regular attacks on military and police installations, and civilians -- often from safe havens in the mountains, as well as from neighboring Niger and Cameroon. Fighting will claim further thousands of lives in 2014 unless the government adopts significant reforms, including addressing impunity, tackling systemic corruption, and promoting development. This will be made even more difficult as the country prepares for what could be fiercely contested general elections in 2015.
Bangladesh enters 2014 amid escalating political
violence. Scores of people died and hundreds were injured in clashes between
the opposition and security forces ahead of general elections scheduled for
January, the former embracing a growing campaign of violent nationwide
shutdowns, or hartals. The opposition Bangladesh National Party (BNP)
has said it will boycott the elections, accusing the ruling Awami League (AL)
of authoritarian rule and plans to rig the polls.
A boycott would deepen the crisis and lead to more deadly
violence. Merely postponing polls -- as some have suggested -- without a
roadmap for how to hold credible elections in the future is also not the
solution. There is deep animosity between the heads of the AL and BNP,
Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina and Khaleda Zia, who have been swapping power
since 1991. A phone call between them in October 2013 -- reportedly their first
conversation in over a decade -- quickly deteriorated into barbs about each other's
mental health.
The roots of Bangladeshi political polarization run deep. Over the past two years, a government-appointed tribunal has carried out profoundly flawed trials for war crimes committed during the country's 1971 war of liberation from Pakistan. To date, everyone on trial is a Bangladeshi citizen. No one from the Pakistani military, the main force resisting the liberation of what was then East Pakistan, has been indicted. Making matters worse, the sentencing to death of six members of the BNP and Islamist Jamaat-e-Islami parties -- for allegedly trying to sabotage the country's formation -- has inflated religious-versus-secular social divisions and spawned the radicalization of newer groups like Hefajat-e-Islam.
The only way out is via credible elections and a stable, responsive government. For that, Sheikh Hasina and Khaleda Zia must overcome their mutual loathing and negotiate an inclusive roadmap. The risks are manifold. Since 1971, the military has attempted some 30 coups, about a fifth of them successful. In two, prime ministers were assassinated, including Sheikh Hasina's father, Mujibur Rahman. Today, the military remains a risk. Finally, the potential radicalization of Rohingya refugees, human rights concerns, and Bangladesh's complicated economic trajectory all make for an explosive mix.
The roots of Bangladeshi political polarization run deep. Over the past two years, a government-appointed tribunal has carried out profoundly flawed trials for war crimes committed during the country's 1971 war of liberation from Pakistan. To date, everyone on trial is a Bangladeshi citizen. No one from the Pakistani military, the main force resisting the liberation of what was then East Pakistan, has been indicted. Making matters worse, the sentencing to death of six members of the BNP and Islamist Jamaat-e-Islami parties -- for allegedly trying to sabotage the country's formation -- has inflated religious-versus-secular social divisions and spawned the radicalization of newer groups like Hefajat-e-Islam.
The only way out is via credible elections and a stable, responsive government. For that, Sheikh Hasina and Khaleda Zia must overcome their mutual loathing and negotiate an inclusive roadmap. The risks are manifold. Since 1971, the military has attempted some 30 coups, about a fifth of them successful. In two, prime ministers were assassinated, including Sheikh Hasina's father, Mujibur Rahman. Today, the military remains a risk. Finally, the potential radicalization of Rohingya refugees, human rights concerns, and Bangladesh's complicated economic trajectory all make for an explosive mix.
The 2014 Afghanistan drawdown is not the only thing to
worry about in Central Asia. Most countries in this region are governed by
aging leaders and have no succession mechanisms -- in itself potentially a
recipe for chaos. All have young, alienated populations and decaying
infrastructure.
Uzbekistan, a perpetually difficult neighbor, squabbles
with Kyrgyzstan over borders and with Tajikistan over
water. Moscow is warning of a buildup of Central Asian guerrillas on
the Afghan side of the border, and is ramping up military assistance.
Tajikistan, the main frontline state, is also deeply vulnerable -- with low
governance capacity, high corruption, barely functional security forces, and
limited control over some strategically sensitive regions. It is also a
key transit route for opiates destined for Russia and beyond.
In Kyrgyzstan, extreme nationalist politics threaten
not just the country's social fabric, but its economy too, as some
politicians seek political and possibly financial gain by hounding foreign
investors in the crucial mining sector. Crime and corruption are endemic.
The harshly authoritarian state of Uzbekistan is Moscow's biggest irritant
and the United States' closest ally in the region. And yet its
president, Islam Karimov, may have lost control over his own family: His
eldest daughter, Gulnara, is suspected of having her own presidential
ambitions and has lashed out against her mother as
well as Uzbekistan's security chief, probably the country's second
most powerful figure. Neighbors fear post-Karimov instability could
trigger waves of refugees, a further pressure on their poorly defined
borders.
Resource-rich Kazakhstan, meanwhile, has ambitions of regional leadership, but it could just as easily be undone by a host of internal problems. Investors like China worry that the Kazakhs have made heavy weather of handling even very modest insurgency problems. The country also suffers from a serious lack of transparency for foreign investment, enormous income disparities, a poor human rights record, and increasing pressure from Moscow. It also needs to design a smooth transition mechanism for its long-time leader, Nursultan Nazarbayev. Finally, Turkmenistan, generously endowed with hydrocarbons but weak in governance, hopes to withstand any post Afghanistan spillover by doing a deal with its new leaders. This has worked in the past, but there is no guarantee it will in the future.
Resource-rich Kazakhstan, meanwhile, has ambitions of regional leadership, but it could just as easily be undone by a host of internal problems. Investors like China worry that the Kazakhs have made heavy weather of handling even very modest insurgency problems. The country also suffers from a serious lack of transparency for foreign investment, enormous income disparities, a poor human rights record, and increasing pressure from Moscow. It also needs to design a smooth transition mechanism for its long-time leader, Nursultan Nazarbayev. Finally, Turkmenistan, generously endowed with hydrocarbons but weak in governance, hopes to withstand any post Afghanistan spillover by doing a deal with its new leaders. This has worked in the past, but there is no guarantee it will in the future.
While Afghanistan will undoubtedly be the focus of the
international community again in 2014, Central Asia's states will continue to
grapple with their own individual and unique circumstances in a corner of the
world too long cast as a pawn in someone else's game.
This February, Russia will host the Winter Olympics --
at $47 billion, the most expensive ever -- in the Black Sea resort
of Sochi. But security is even more of a problem than cost: Europe's most
active ongoing conflict is taking place nearby in the North Caucasus. If
the Olympics motto is "faster, higher, stronger," Putin's motto in
approaching the North Caucasus insurgency appears to be "meaner,
tougher, stronger."
The leader of the North Caucasus Islamist insurgency, Doku Umarov, has threatened to disrupt the Olympics and urged militants to use all available means to commit terrorist attacks across Russia. His efforts appear to have paid off: In 2013, there were at least 30 terrorist attacks in southern Russia, according to independent media sources. Twin bombings on Monday, Dec. 30, that killed dozens in Volgograd -- responsibility for which is as yet unclaimed -- speak to the nature of the terrorist threat. In response, the Russian government has rolled out unprecedented security measures in Sochi, and strengthened border controls to prevent infiltration of fighters from abroad and minimize the risk emanating from the North Caucasus, especially its most restive republic, Dagestan.
Unfortunately, some of these measures could worsen the situation. In Jan. 2013, Russian President Vladimir Putin replaced Dagestan's president and overhauled the republic's nuanced security strategy, which had been showing signs of success. Along with vigorous anti-corruption measures, the new president, Ramazan Abdulatipov, backed a wave of repression against the Dagestan's vibrant Salafi community. Security forces conducted mop-up operations in villages, arrested large groups of believers from cafes, madrassas, and homes, and intimidated moderate Salafi leaders, civic organizations, and businesses. Modest initiatives at inter-sectarian dialogue have ceased. Abdulatipov also closed the commission for rehabilitation of fighters and encouraged the creation of people's militias, supposedly to combat extremism. These, however, have already been involved in intra-confessional violence.
Equally troubling was the announcement in September by Yunus-bek Yevkurov, president of another North Caucasus republic, Ingushetia, that the homes of insurgents' families will be demolished and their land seized. In nearby Kabardino-Balkariya, the civilian president, Arsen Kanokov, was replaced by the former chief of the Interior Ministry's Department for Combating Extremism -- not exactly known for its subtle approach to security.
The leader of the North Caucasus Islamist insurgency, Doku Umarov, has threatened to disrupt the Olympics and urged militants to use all available means to commit terrorist attacks across Russia. His efforts appear to have paid off: In 2013, there were at least 30 terrorist attacks in southern Russia, according to independent media sources. Twin bombings on Monday, Dec. 30, that killed dozens in Volgograd -- responsibility for which is as yet unclaimed -- speak to the nature of the terrorist threat. In response, the Russian government has rolled out unprecedented security measures in Sochi, and strengthened border controls to prevent infiltration of fighters from abroad and minimize the risk emanating from the North Caucasus, especially its most restive republic, Dagestan.
Unfortunately, some of these measures could worsen the situation. In Jan. 2013, Russian President Vladimir Putin replaced Dagestan's president and overhauled the republic's nuanced security strategy, which had been showing signs of success. Along with vigorous anti-corruption measures, the new president, Ramazan Abdulatipov, backed a wave of repression against the Dagestan's vibrant Salafi community. Security forces conducted mop-up operations in villages, arrested large groups of believers from cafes, madrassas, and homes, and intimidated moderate Salafi leaders, civic organizations, and businesses. Modest initiatives at inter-sectarian dialogue have ceased. Abdulatipov also closed the commission for rehabilitation of fighters and encouraged the creation of people's militias, supposedly to combat extremism. These, however, have already been involved in intra-confessional violence.
Equally troubling was the announcement in September by Yunus-bek Yevkurov, president of another North Caucasus republic, Ingushetia, that the homes of insurgents' families will be demolished and their land seized. In nearby Kabardino-Balkariya, the civilian president, Arsen Kanokov, was replaced by the former chief of the Interior Ministry's Department for Combating Extremism -- not exactly known for its subtle approach to security.
Sochi must be secure for the Games. But the return to harsh
and heavy-handed policies is likely to intensify the conflict once the Games
have ended, suggesting that 2014 will be another bloody year for
southern Russia.
- See more at:
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/12/28/the_list_the_stories_you_missed_in_2013#sthash.iYo30Isz.nZ5oqFQb.dpuf
Louise Arbour is president of the International Crisis Group.