Soon They’ll Be Driving It, Too
Intelligent machines are ousting
low-skilled workers now. Next they’ll start encroaching on white-collar
livelihoods.
[We Americans can be pretty good workers, too]
By Sumit Paul-Choudhury in the Wall Street Journal
Should you be worried by the emergence of intelligent machines? To some
the answer is clear. “Full artificial intelligence could spell the end of the
human race,” Stephen Hawking
warned recently. Martin Ford’s “Rise of the Robots” offers a more prosaic
reason for concern: Partially intelligent machines might render humans not so
much extinct as redundant. “No one doubts that technology has the power to
devastate entire industries and upend specific sectors of the economy and job
market,” writes Mr. Ford, a Silicon Valley software developer turned futurist.
Will machine intelligence, tackling tasks once thought of as humanity’s
exclusive preserve, “disrupt our entire system to the point where a fundamental
restructuring may be required if prosperity is to continue?”
Mr. Ford invokes Norbert Wiener, who
in 1949 prophesied an “industrial revolution of unmitigated cruelty” in which
machines would outstrip humans in routine work “at any price.” In Mr. Ford’s
view, just such a revolution is under way in blue-collar work. Robots are
ousting low-skilled workers everywhere, from fast-food joints to factory
floors—a trend that Mr. Ford argues is central to the puzzling “jobless
recovery” of the past decade as well as to other anomalous trends in pay and
employment.
Now the machines are encroaching on
white-collar livelihoods, which is why the intelligentsia have begun to wake up
to their advance. To date, most automation has been of routine tasks that are
relatively easy to describe in terms of simple instructions. But the
combination of ever faster processors, ever smarter algorithms and ever bigger
data is yielding supercomputers that are ever more capable of tackling complex
challenges. IBM ’s
Watson, having triumphed over human champion Ken Jennings at “Jeopardy!,” is
now turning to medicine and cookery. Other machines are proving their mettle in
fields ranging from scientific research to the stock market. Creativity no
longer seems an insurmountable obstacle: Computers are starting to compose
music or create paintings that could pass for the work of humans.
We are still a long way from
all-round human intelligence—smart machines are becoming more flexible but
still tend to excel in only a specific area—but Mr. Ford lucidly sets out
myriad examples of how focused applications of versatile machines (coupled with
human helpers where necessary) could displace or de-skill many jobs. If you are
of the professional classes, you will likely read with mounting dismay Mr.
Ford’s compelling explanation of how tools that encapsulate “analytic
intelligence and institutional knowledge” will enable less qualified rivals to
carry out your job proficiently, quite possibly from another country. An
intelligent system might mine huge corporate data sets to distill years of
experience into simple instructions for an overseas worker—who can then use
translation and telepresence to overcome linguistic and geographical barriers.
When the tools systems have become smart enough, those offshore workers may in
turn be deemed surplus: In a particularly dastardly move, computers may even
acquire those smarts by spying on their human users.
The author is persuasive in his
discussion of the business logic that makes this process seem all but
inevitable. Machines may be less accomplished than humans, but they are often
cheaper, more dependable and more docile. While you might worry about their
growing abilities, it is the economic incentives that seem truly problematic.
Mr. Ford worries that if this trend runs away it will prove bad for all but the
ultra-wealthy capitalists who own the machines. Because workers are consumers
too, a declining workforce translates into declining demand, and that threatens
the entire edifice of modern capitalism. Continue as we are, he suggests, and
we may return to feudalism.
Will we? Why should this time be any
different from previous waves of automation, in which displaced workers have
moved, after some initial disorientation, to satisfactory new jobs? Machine
intelligence, says Mr. Ford, is a general-purpose technology with broad
applications: There will be few untouched fields to which workers can turn in
their search for employment. Still, his copious examples, striking though they
are, add up to no more than strong circumstantial evidence for that claim.
We should always be skeptical about
the difficulty of transferring polished theories into unruly reality. And for the
moment, there will remain bastions of human exceptionalism. One recent analysis
suggests that “highly creative” work (including architecture, design and
entertainment), which accounts for around a fifth of U.S. jobs, will prove
intransigent. Mr. Ford also dedicates chapters to the ways in which the
health-care and educational sectors have resisted automation.
Could we find new jobs in these
areas for those put out of work by automation? The author’s short answer is
that we can’t. Those at the bottom of the labor pyramid aren’t capable of doing
jobs higher up it, and there wouldn’t be enough of those jobs anyway. Rather
surprisingly, he gives only passing treatment to the potential deployment of
intelligent machines to up-skill workers. “For the majority of people who lose
middle-class jobs, access to a smart phone may offer little beyond the ability
to play Angry Birds while waiting in the unemployment line,” he writes. Today’s
smartphones, yes; but tomorrow’s smarter phones may enhance their owners’ reach
and abilities in more productive ways.
The author’s apparent reluctance to
engage with technological solutions to a technological problem perhaps reveals
where his true object lies. His answer to a sharp decline in employment is a
guaranteed basic income, a safety net that he suggests would both cushion the
effect on the newly unemployable and encourage entrepreneurship among those
creative enough to make a new way for themselves. This is a drastic
prescription for the ills of modern industrialization—ills whose severity and
very existence are hotly contested. “Rise of the Robots” provides a compelling
case that they are real, even if its more dire predictions are harder to
accept.
—
Mr. Paul-Choudhury is the editor of New Scientist.
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