Terrorist
armies fight smarter and deadlier than ever
By Robert H. Scales and Douglas Ollivant
Robert H. Scales, a
retired Army major general, is a former commandant of the U.S. Army War
College. Douglas A. Ollivant is a fellow at the New America Foundation’s Future
of War project.
Military
transformations can be hard to detect. They generally occur over decades,
sometimes over generations. Soldiers are usually the first to recognize them,
but for the perceptive, the signs of a sea change developing on today’s
battlefields are there. Look carefully at media images of ground fighting
across the Middle East, and you will notice that the bad guys are fighting
differently than they have in the past.
In the immediate aftermath
of the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, the West confronted terrorists who acted
like, well, terrorists. In Iraq and Afghanistan, al-Qaeda and other militant
groups relied on ambushes, roadside bombings, sniper fire and the occasional
“fire and run” mortar or rocket attack to inflict casualties on U.S. forces.
When terrorists
were stupid enough to come out of the shadows, they fought as a mob of
individuals. One rip of a Kalashnikov or a single launch of a rocket-propelled
grenade was enough. If they stood to reload, they risked annihilation at the
hands of their disciplined, well-trained and heavily armed American opponents.
Today, it’s
different. We see Islamist fighters becoming skilled soldiers. The thrust of the Islamic State down the Euphrates
River illustrates a style of warfare that melds old and new. U.S. soldiers
fighting in Iraq used to say: “Thank God they can’t shoot.” Well, now they can.
They maneuver in reasonably disciplined formations, often aboard pickup trucks
and captured Iraqi Humvees. They employ mortars and rockets in deadly barrages.
To be sure, parts of the old terrorist playbook remain: They butcher and
execute prisoners to make unambiguously clear the terrible consequences of
resistance. They continue to display an eager willingness for death and the media savvy of the “propaganda
of the deed.”
We see these newly
formed pseudo-armies emerging across the Levant as well. The Darwinian process
of wartime immersion has forced them to either get better or die.
Some observers of
the transformation admit that Hezbollah now is among the most skilled light
infantry on the planet. And now there is Hamas. Gone are the loose and fleeting
groups of fighters seen during Operation Cast Lead in 2008. In Gaza they have
been fighting in well-organized, tightly bound teams under the authority of
connected, well-informed commanders. Units stand and fight from building
hideouts and tunnel entrances. They wait for the Israelis to pass by before
ambushing them from the rear. Like Hezbollah and the Islamic State, they are
getting good with second-generation weapons such as the Russian RPG-29 and,
according to as-yet-unconfirmed reports from the fighting in Gaza, wire-guided anti-tank
missiles.
These fighters are
now well-armed, well-trained and well-led and are often flush with cash to buy
or bribe their way out of difficulties. While the story of the disintegration
of the Iraqi army is multi-causal, the fact that it was never trained to face
such an opponent as competent as the Islamic State was certainly a factor.
This frightening
new age is emerging due to several factors that neither the United States nor
Israeli forces anticipated. First is the influence of foreign fighters. Iranian
advisers throughout the Middle East are getting better at their craft.
Radicalized fighters from the Chechen and Bosnian conflicts serve Islamic State
forces as mentors. The terrorists of the last decade generated one-shot suicide
bombers of little strategic consequence. Now they have learned to build
fighting units and teach weapons and tactics very well.
Second, the bloody
Syrian war has served as a first-rate training ground for the Islamic State and
Hezbollah. The crucible of that terrible war permitted them to forge leaders,
practice tactics, train to maneuver on the urban battlefield and build
political and military institutions with mass and resiliency. Perversely,
having these two Islamist organizations in conflict with each other has made
each one stronger, not weaker.
Third, these new
armies talk to each other, even occasionally across ethno-sectarian divisions.
Social media and strategic intercessions in Syria, Lebanon, Gaza and Iraq have
created a body of well-informed and battle-hardened leaders and soldiers who
share lessons learned.
Fourth, while these
new armies are becoming more professional, they retain the terrorist’s
specialty of disciplined killing. Terrorist killing used to be mostly random.
But now killings are often orchestrated, media-driven executions of
surrendering soldiers and opposition leaders. Such strategic killing can give
the armies a psychological advantage before the clash of arms begins.
What we see in
Gaza, Syria and Iraq should serve as a cautionary tale for any Beltway guru
calling for a return of U.S. forces to Iraq. U.S. soldiers and Marines are
still the global gold standard, but their comparative advantage has diminished.
As terrorist groups turn into armies, pairing their fanatical dedication with
newly acquired tactical skills, renewed intervention might generate casualties
on a new scale — as the Israelis have been painfully learning.
Poster’s comments:
1)
This is a decent situation report. The present times are different from even a
decade ago.
2)
Don’t discount the skills of the Americans.
3)
The 82nd Airborne, the 10th
Mountain, and the US Marines are a pretty good and skilled light infantry, too.
4)
Our light infantry can get heavy fire support and
logistic support (like beans bullets, and band aids), too, which is often
needed if the poo poo hits the fan.
5)
American special forces of all flavors are also light
forces of a sort.
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